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 This dissertation consists of three papers, each of which addresses what I believe 
are important gaps in the literature. The first is the impact regional asymmetric costs can 
have on mitigation and adaptation decisions. Regional cost asymmetries are not unknown 
in the extant literature, but their implications are generally ignored in much of the 
modeling that exists. The second gap involves the cursory treatment climate science 
findings receive in macroeconomic modeling.  Development of climate system dynamics 
from climate science has continued over the last two decades, but little progress has been 
made on incorporating new developments into post-Keynesian macromodels. Finally, the 
third gap is the lack of time series methods in the empirical research on the climate-
macroeconomic interaction from a global perspective. It is known that GDP (Gross 
Domestic Product) and CO2 production are highly related, but questions remain as to how 
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CLIMATE CHANGE, PROCRASTINATION, AND ASYMMETRIC POWER 
 
Korkut Alp Ertürk and Jason Whittle
1
 
This paper argues that policy conclusions of the economics of climate change 
literature based on ‘integrated assessment models’ (IAM) fail to take into account the 
intricacies of collective action. Specifically, IAMs do not account for how asymmetric 
power between developed and undeveloped countries changes the former’s payoff matrix 
with respect to mitigation and adaptation strategies. Using a simple one-sided prisoner’s 
dilemma model, the paper illustrates how developed countries’ power to externalize their 
emissions to the global commons skews their cost-benefit calculation in favor of putting 
off mitigation efforts into the future.  Undeveloped countries, on the other hand, are 
incentivized to act in concert to deter developed countries from passing their climate 
costs onto them in the present. The extent to which they may succeed in doing so also 
helps developed countries overcome their ‘short-termism’ on climate change policy.
                                                 
1
 We would like to thank Richard Pereira, John Tomer, Tarik Banuri, Hans Ehrbar, and 
Brett Clark for all their helpful comments and acknowledge full responsibility for all the 





The current ongoing debate on what to do about anthropogenic climate change 
boils down to two essential options, mitigation or adaptation. Mitigation involves an 
attempt to avoid climate change all together by limiting greenhouse gas (GHG) output 
now.  Adaptation involves putting off dealing with the impacts of climate change into the 
future.  Adaptation is a strategy of incurring costs in the long term whereas mitigation is a 
strategy of incurring them much sooner.   
A curious divergence of opinion has developed between climatologists and 
economists on the preferred course of action with respect to these two policy options in 
recent years. The weight of opinion among the former has decisively shifted towards 
mitigation, but economists have continued to favor adaptation, arguing that the costs of 
trying to mitigate climate change right away might exceed its benefits.  
Economists’ arguments derive from cost-benefit analyses based on models that 
specify what policy is optimal. These models are often criticized for the unreliability of 
their assumptions, for understating costs and the risk of adverse climatic responses to 
warming while being overly sanguine about the ability of human societies to adapt to 
future impacts of climate change. More importantly, they are also criticized for ignoring 
the uncertainty about the possibility of an ecological catastrophe, the risk of which 
increasingly worries climatologists. Although we agree with these criticisms and point to 
the conceptual limitations of the type of cost-benefit analyses they undertake as others 
have done (Akerman, DeCanio, Howarth, & Sheeran, 2009; Ackerman & Stanton, 2013; 
Pindyck, 2013; Stern, 2007; Tol, Frankhauser, Kuik, & Smith, 2003,), our criticism takes 




the intricacies of collective action. Perfunctory references to the ‘tragedy of the 
commons’ and the ‘free-riding problem’ are commonplace in this literature, but there is 
little recognition of how costs distributed across agents with asymmetric power can 
distort cost-benefit calculus and change what policy option is ‘optimal’. In addition to 
having important policy implications, this lack of recognition also matters for the 
discourse on climate change policy, since economists often make the heroic assumption 
that societies, just like individuals, would do what is optimal if they are ‘rational.’  
Most studies consider whether or not a strategy of mitigation or adaptation is in 
the best interest of an individual country or a group of countries in a region.  Whether or 
not collective action is achieved in favor of pursuing a global policy of mitigation 
depends on a critical mass of countries or regions finding such a policy to have a clear 
cost-benefit interest for them individually. Often, this is where the analysis ends.  Of 
course, however, what policy is optimal for an individual country depends very much on 
what others do, and thus the argument becomes circular when we try to determine the 
collective outcome by summing up individual decisions.   
Adaptation involves the emitter distributing its GHG emissions into the global 
commons, externalizing them into all countries and regions regardless of their own 
emissions and level of vulnerability. Mitigation, by contrast, entails the emitter 
internalizing the costs it emits within its economy.  Two general implications follow from 
this.  One, because costs of mitigation are incurred individually whereas its benefits 
accrue to all, adaptation gives its pursuers a free-ride by those who mitigate.  Given this 
intrinsic free-rider problem, mitigation requires extensive if not full cooperation and is 




from cooperation, i.e., all around adaptation that involves distributing costs to the global 
commons by all, amounts to passing on costs from high to low emitters.  
Given the strong correlation between the rate of emission and the level of 
economic activity, low emitters are generally the poor and high emitters the rich 
countries.  Poor countries also tend to be located in regions more vulnerable to climate 
change, which also lowers their bargaining power over global policy on climate change. 
Asymmetric power between the rich and the poor enables high emitters to shift costs onto 
the low emitters with relative impunity, and that makes “kicking the can down the road” 
tempting for developed countries, undercutting their interest in forging the harder to 
achieve but in the long run the superior, coordinated solution mitigation requires.   
Procrastination, however, could lose much of its appeal if the emitters lacked the power 
to pass on costs with impunity. If all adversely affected powerless actors could act in 
unison to deter cost shifting by the emitters, mitigation might become the preferred policy 
for the powerful players. In other words, the power balancing effect of such a coalition 
could be the very impetus for overcoming short-termism and instead acting in their long-
term enlightened self-interest, which implies that in evaluating different policy options, 
an important consideration should be whether they help or hinder coalition building on 
the part of the powerless actors. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In subsections 2.1 and 2.2, we give a 
brief overview of the positions taken, respectively, by economists and climatologists on 
climate change. In subsections 2.3 and 2.4, we situate the climate change policy debate in 
the context of a clash between short-term and long-term objectives and go on to argue in 




developed countries. We emphasize the importance of power balancing by undeveloped 
countries through coalition building in overcoming ‘short-termism’ and point to the 
policy implications of our argument.  We end with a brief conclusion. 
 
1.2. The Economics of Climate Change 
Economic studies of climate change impact began in the late 1980s and early 
1990s (Cline, 1992; Nordhaus, 1991, 1992).  Many of these studies looked at a single 
country such as the U.S., asking what the impact would be of a doubling of the 
preindustrial level of atmospheric CO2 concentration (560 ppm) on sectors of the 
economy most dependent on nature such as agriculture. Since agriculture makes up only 
about 2 to 3% of the U.S. and most other OECD countries’ GDP (Tol et al., 2003) and 
other vulnerable sectors make a similarly  small relative contribution, these initial 
estimates of the economic impact of global warming were small. When these country-
specific studies were aggregated to the rest of the world, the global impact was likewise 
found to be relatively insignificant.
2
 This first generation of impact assessment models 
estimated about a 1.5 to 2% cost in terms of global GDP for a doubling of pre-industrial 
CO2 concentration with associated levels of warming in the range of 2.5c (Tol et al., 
2003).
3
  Clearly, none of these studies lent support to a policy of mitigation as they 
seemed to suggest that waiting to mitigate greenhouse gas emissions (implicitly choosing 
an adaptation policy) involved relatively modest costs. 
                                                 
2
 See, for instance, Nordhaus’ (1992) DICE model. 
3
 In these models, the warming levels assumed from given increases in CO2 concentration 




However, most developing countries derive a much higher relative share of their 
GDP from agriculture, often in excess of 50%, than do OECD countries, and thus using 
the U.S. or Europe’s agricultural impact as a baseline for these countries grossly 
underestimated the impact of climate change on developing countries (Nordhaus & Yang 
1996; Tol et al., 2003). The problem was addressed by regionally calibrating the impact 
assessment models (Mendelsohn, Dinar, & Williams, 2006; Mendelsohn & Schlesinger, 
1999; Nordhaus & Yang, 1996). These so-called ‘integrated assessment models’ (IAMs) 
showed that different regions in the world would be affected very differently by climate 
change, especially in the initial phase of global warming. Out of this literature came the 
‘hill-shaped’ response function to climate change (Mendelsohn et al., 2006). According 
to this function, the impact of rising temperature is initially positive on a cool region’s 
economy and becomes negative only past a certain threshold after the region’s climate 
becomes too warm. The regions that are already warm in lower latitudes in many parts of 
Africa and Southeast Asia with limited ability to protect coastal areas are the most 
vulnerable (Mendelsohn et al., 2006). By contrast, warming initially is expected to move 
other regions such as Russia, Canada, some parts of the U.S., and Europe, to a 
temperature level that might be economically beneficial (Mendelsohn et al., 2006). 
These findings implied that developed regions had less of an incentive to opt for 
corrective action early on than undeveloped and regionally vulnerable areas. The latter 
faced not only immediate costs but also the prospect that these costs could accumulate to 
debilitating and possibly catastrophic levels by the time developed countries ceased 




not tip the scales much in a global cost-benefit analysis,
4
 because relatively small gains in 
a country like the U.S. more than offset the economic devastation in smaller undeveloped 
countries in the aggregate because of the smaller size of their economies.
5
 Thus, delaying 
mitigation could be shown to involve a net benefit until warming reached higher levels, 
which led to the notion that there was some ‘optimal’ level of warming. 
  Nordhaus (2010) specifies what this optimal level might be and compares it 
against several different climate scenarios. He starts out by calibrating a worst-case 
baseline scenario, involving a situation where no action is taken by world governments 
with emission growth proceeding unchecked. Atmospheric CO2 concentrations reach 795 
ppm by 2100 and top 1200 ppm by 2200. Warming from such levels of CO2 is estimated 
to reach 3.5c by 2100, eventually peaking at a 6.7c increase relative to 1900 
temperatures. It is uniformly accepted that such levels of warming would most likely 
involve an ecological disaster (IPCC, Core Writing Team, 2007). 
Nordhaus’ ‘optimal’ scenario, an example of what an ‘adaptation’ strategy might 
look like, involves the reduction of CO2 emission level to 50% of its 2005 level by 2100, 
where warming peaks at a 3c increase with atmospheric concentration rising to 600 ppm.
6
 
                                                 
4
 Note that these models made the implicit assumption that the marginal utility of 
consumption in poor countries is the same as that in rich countries. Known as ‘Negishi-
weighing,’ this assumption basically amounts to ruling out of consideration any 
improvement in global welfare through income redistribution (Stanton, 2009). We thank 
Tariq Banuri for pointing this out. 
5
 These estimates from the 1990s predate the explosive economic growth of China and 
India. In Nordhaus and Yang (1996), India is part of “the rest of the world” but China is 
mentioned only in passing. Today, China is the second largest national economy and the 
largest emitter of CO2 in the world. Reaching any global climate targets today would 
require both China and India to mitigate along with developed countries. 
6 These estimates are again on the optimistic side of the spectrum as they leave out land 
use changes and greenhouse gases other than CO2, and assume the lower bound of 




Comparing the optimal with the baseline scenario, he estimates that the former yields a 
higher level of global consumption by 8.06 trillion in 2005 USD, a 0.35% improvement 
in discounted income over the baseline scenario. He then compares the optimal 
(adaptation) scenario with what might be called mitigation, defined as maintaining a 2c 
ceiling on warming by taking more immediate action, which the climate science 
community has been advocating (more on this below). He calls this the ‘temperature 
limited’ case and estimates that it requires again roughly a 50% cut in emissions from 
their 2005 levels, but much sooner, by 2075. Now, CO2 concentration rises to 500 ppm 
by mid-century and eventually stabilizes at 450 ppm. This case also fares significantly 
better than the worst-case baseline scenario, yielding a 4.37 trillion dollar higher 
discounted income, a 0.19% increase in discounted income, but falls short of the optimal 
case by roughly half.  
  This is perhaps the clearest statement of the basis on which economists believe 
that developed countries can reap a net benefit from delaying mitigation. They oppose 
trying to limit warming to 2c or less, since that becomes very costly “because of the 
difficulty of attaining that target with so much inertia in the climate system” (Nordhaus, 
2010, p. 11724).  The intriguing question is whether economists might be peddling fool’s 
gold. At the risk of sounding alarmist, climatologists think that delaying mitigation is 
tantamount to playing Russian roulette with the planet’s very survival. For them, the 
notion that one part of the planet can benefit from warming while the other part is 
devastated is not only misguided but also a dangerous illusion (Stern, 2007). 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
66) estimates that warming from the same level of CO2 concentration (600ppm) can be as 





When looked at from the point of view of climate science, the picture is grim. 
Climate scientists warn that humanity is risking leaving behind the very climatological 
epoch - the Holocene era of the last 12,000 years - that gave it agriculture, science, and 
industry (Hansen et al., 2008).  Their main concern is that warming can trigger a 
nonlinear reaction that takes the planet to a fundamentally different climate system where 
warming intensifies independently of what humans do. If that were to happen, any 
mitigation effort at that point would be too late. 
With global temperature at its warmest level in the Holocene, little additional 
climate forcing from GHG emissions and land use changes is required to trigger positive 
feedbacks. Rapid melting of land ice as recently observed in Greenland
7
 is an example of 
the kinds of changes that can give rise to the feared positive feedback effects given that
 
ice reflects 90% of the solar radiation hitting it whereas water and land absorb nearly all 
of it. The rising CO2 content of the deep oceans and surface albedo can also trigger 
positive feedback effects. If these changes show up earlier than expected, as is now more 
likely than before, warming can proceed even without any additional forcing. Climate 
change would then be locked into a trajectory of automatic warming that could be next to 
impossible to mitigate, which is what climatologists are becoming increasingly concerned 
about (Hansen, 2008; IPCC, Core Writing Team, 2007, 2014; Stern, 2007). 
No one knows with any precision when such a tipping point might occur. Yet, 
there is little doubt that these tipping points are real, and that makes the situation 
alarming. In previous periods of higher CO2 ppm atmospheric concentrations and higher 
                                                 
7
 In the summer of 2012, the melting in the Greenland ice sheet in just 4 days jumped 




temperature, the speed at which CO2 ppm increased was approximately 0.01 ppm per 
year. Now, humans are increasing it by 2 ppm per year (Hansen, Caldeira, & Rohling, 
2011). Never before in Earth’s recorded history has so much CO2 been added to the 
atmosphere from year to year. It is possible that warming up to the economically 
‘optimal’ level of 3c might entail crossing some tipping points. Of course, building in 
additional warming beyond 3c will only increase the risk of passing that critical threshold 
beyond which mitigation becomes much more costly, if at all possible. 
Because crossing tipping points can have such grave consequences, climatologists 
call for immediate action to prevent them from happening at all costs (Hansen, 2008; 
Hansen et al., 2008; Hansen et al., 2011; IPCC, Core Writing Team, 2007, 2014; Stern, 
2007). In their view, the current CO2 ppm concentration of 400 ppm is already too high. 
Even if such tipping points are not crossed, warming risks causing irreparable damage to 
the ecosystem as it is. The northerly migration of plant and animal zones that has already 
been taking place is an alarming sign. Given that humanity relies on the ecosystem for its 
survival, pushing it to its breaking point threatens not only polar bears but also 
civilization itself (Hansen, 2008).
8
  Minimizing the risk we face requires that climate 
change be limited to 2c, and that means the CO2 concentration should not be allowed to 
exceed 350 ppm. Thus, staying in the “safe” range requires immediate action, which the 
most recent 2014 IPCC again calls for with even more dire warnings than in 2007.  
However, although there might be little uncertainty that climate change is 
happening, climate science still lacks precision on many questions: how much and how 
                                                 
8
 As Daly (1997) and other ecological economists have argued for a long time, it is 





fast warming will occur; how sensitive the climate will be to rising CO2 levels, land use 
changes, and other greenhouse gases; and how the Earth will change climatically and 
physically at rising levels of warming. Thus, cost estimates unsurprisingly remain far 
from robust and fail to converge over time. In fact, the danger of an ecological disaster 
and the uncertainty it creates brings into question the very viability of the exercise. If 
future contingent outcomes cannot even be specified given the level of uncertainty, cost 
estimates end up becoming arbitrary as slight variations in what contingent scenarios 
unfold produce drastically different results.
9
 How does one quantify the increased 
extinction risk of a given percentage of species and estimate its implications for the 
ecosystem over time?  
 
1.4. Changing Preferences and Procrastination 
Economists engage in considerable cherry picking in their cost benefit analyses, 
but otherwise, their assumptions are based on climate science, albeit with a time lag. As 
climate scientists’ forecasts become more pessimistic over time, economists are soon 
likely to revise their optimistic assumptions at least on issues related to hard science. One 
exception that appears impervious to changing opinion within climate science involves 
discounting, a putative forte of economists.   
With a given set of science-based assumptions, the balance between the present 
value of long-run costs and benefits from growth can vary drastically depending on what 
                                                 
9
 Most economics models neglect possible sudden impacts such as rapid ice melt off or 
sudden sea level rise let alone an ecological catastrophe, however defined (Akerman et 
al., 2009; Pindyck, 2013; Roughgarden & Schneider, 1999; Stern, 2007). See Weitzman 
(2011) for a broader discussion of deep structural uncertainty and “fat tails” in critical 




discount rate one uses.
10
  Economists postulate a pure discount rate based on the 
presumption that a time-invariant time preference of consumption exists for humanity as 
a whole.
11
 This rate supposedly captures our inborn impatience, which makes us prefer 
consumption today over consumption tomorrow. A higher discount rate values current 
consumption more heavily relative to future consumption in general and, holding all else 
constant, makes mitigation less desirable given that future costs then weigh relatively less 
today.  
We believe that economists can make a better contribution to the debate on 
climate change if they focus on how behavior might be affected when preferences evolve 
over time rather than postulating an invariant discount rate that seems unconvincing. 
Defining our relative preference for immediate consumption independently of what we 
think of how our actions today might influence the future might be of doubtful value. 
Given that our preferences are all mediated by some form of cognition
12
 (Bowles, 1998), 
it is only reasonable to think that they would change when our understanding of how 
what we do today affects what happens in the future changes. Thus, as humanity absorbs 
the findings of climate science regarding the risks associated with delayed action on 
climate change, the notion that the pure discount rate would militate against taking action 
sooner rather than later lacks purchase.  
                                                 
10 See Stern (2006), Nordhaus (2007), and Azar and Sterner (1996). 
11
 The discount rate is thought to comprise a pure time-preference component and 
another part that reflects marginal utility of consumption that is expected to diminish with 
increasing levels of affluence (Arrrow et al., 1995; Fankhauser, 1994). Here our 
discussion focuses on the former.  
12
 The exception being the subset of preferences that find expression in visceral reactions 




Changing views on smoking is one example of how our preferences change when 
our notion of the future consequences of our actions today changes. Few today doubt that 
smoking is harmful, including those who continue to smoke (CPPE, 2011).  Once the 
future consequences of our actions are better understood, our subjective evaluation of 
costs today versus costs tomorrow also changes. The more pertinent problem is that this 
evaluation might not translate into change in behavior readily. Often when our “long-
term” preferences change, our actual behavior might not, at least for a considerable time, 
and this might be the more important issue for economists to focus on. 
The smoking example also highlights this problem. We know only too well that 
many smokers who want to quit perpetually put off quitting. They do not want to be 
smokers in the long run, but they keep smoking in the present. As is the case with 
procrastination more generally, procrastination involves a situation where the two sets of 
preferences, long- and short-term, are caught up in a perpetual clash. A smoker who 
knows that quitting is good for him or her might still dread the difficult adjustment cost it 
entails in the short run. Continuing to smoke (adaptation) involves rising future health 
costs and risks that can be alarming. However, these costs are mainly probabilistic, long 
run, and thus discounted, whereas the cost of quitting (mitigation) is certain and all front-
loaded, which can make the smoker’s discount rate an important determinant of when 
(and if) he or she will quit. For instance, public health messages that warn teenagers 
about the future health risks of smoking often fall on deaf ears because teenagers tend to 
heavily discount the future. 
We clearly do not consider teenagers’ high discount rate an unchangeable and 




heavily we consider it a moral failing.
13
 If we thought the pure discount rate was an 
immutable given, continuing to smoke for a time could then be shown to entail a net 
utility benefit. In fact, the higher a youngster’s discount rate, i.e., the more “shortsighted” 
one is, the more an economist might advise smoking longer in the name of maximizing 
utility. 
Counseling smoking teenagers not to be rash in quitting and arguing for delayed 
mitigation in climate change policy might have similarities. True, in the case of smoking, 
the relevant trade-off is between the well-being of the same person today versus 
tomorrow, whereas in the case of climate change it is between the well-being of future 
generations versus that of people who are alive now. In both cases, however, the well-
being of the future self or future generations is very much dependent on what the present 
self or generations do in the present, which suggests that what we want for the future and 
do in the present can clash in a similar manner. 
 
1.5. Short-Termism and Climate Change 
Just as the typical teenager, the present generation can be said to have difficulty 
imagining a future that is fundamentally different from the present. This attitude tends to 
shrink the very time horizon that defines the long run. Consider the different time 
horizons involved in how the future or ‘long-run’ is conceptualized respectively by 
                                                 
13 The older generation of economists clearly have thought so. Similar to Aesop’s fable 
with the grasshopper and the ant, Irving Fisher wrote, “Generally speaking, the greater 
the foresight, the less the impatience and vice versa.... This is illustrated by the story of 
the farmer who would never mind his leaking roof. When it rained he could not stop the 
leak, and when it did not rain there was no leak to be stopped! Among such persons, the 
preference for present gratification is powerful because their anticipation of the future is 




economists and climatologists.  The long-run equilibrium of climatologists might take as 
long as a thousand years to materialize. It is a state where the climate forcing effects of 
GHG emissions and land use changes have stabilized and there is no further endogenous 
warming or cooling. By contrast, for economists it is hard enough to trust any long-run 
equilibrium model predicting 10 years out, let alone 100 years.  
This unreliability of long-run economics models means that economists’ models 
cannot possibly take into account the full long-run cost of climate change from a level of 
GHG emissions that upsets the ecological long-run equilibrium. The sea level in the new 
ecological equilibrium might rise, say, enough to leave only the Andes and Himalayas 
dry, but if that takes 1,000 years and we are looking at only the next 100 years at a time, 
the cost of mitigation might remain higher than adaptation in much of the 100-year 
intervals before reaching ecological equilibrium. When finally adaptation becomes the 
more costly option, climate might no longer be responsive to mitigation. One is reminded 
of the story of the frog too lazy to get out of the warming pond under the rising sun, 
finding a way to adapt to the increasing heat every step of the way until it boils to death. 
Economists might have something useful to say on why that happens and how such short-
termism (procrastination) can be overcome.  
Akerlof’s (1991) analysis of the dynamic inconsistency between short- and long- 
run preferences in procrastination gives an idea why the proverbial lazy frog 
procrastinates to death. With a decision horizon that is exceedingly short, taking action 
now rather than later has a salience cost, giving rise to the inability - common to both the 
lazy frog and the grasshopper - to anticipate the future. If the cost of taking corrective 




short-run benefit, the salience of the immediate cost in the current period makes it more 
“costly” than undertaking it in the next. Thus, taking action tomorrow ends up being 
always preferable to doing so today. Our short-term preference is then caught up in a 
perpetual clash with our long-term preference. 
In situations where we know this kind of a clash will occur, we often devise 
practical schemes to safeguard our longer-term preferences. Consider an example from 
Schelling (1984) with our twist on snoozing. Right before going to bed late at night, we 
want to wake up early in the morning and not be late to work, but at the same time we 
know quite well that come morning we will not want to get out of bed. In other words, we 
expect our long-term preference to come into conflict with our short-term preference in 
the morning, and predict that we will keep pushing the snooze button only to end up 
rushing uncomfortably or being late. As we press the snooze button to silence the alarm 
clock for few minutes at a time, our decision horizon is exceedingly short. At the end of 
the first snooze period, we decide to push the snooze button yet again because getting out 
of bed after the next snooze period is preferable to getting out now, and so it goes until 
we end up being late.  
How do we deal with this problem? As Schelling remarks, one possible remedy is 
to put the alarm clock away from the bed to make it harder to delay getting up. Once 
taking action cannot be delayed with ease, the decision time horizon extends and the cost-
benefit calculus then changes, and with it our myopic inability to anticipate the future is 
overcome. In more general terms, the moral is that dealing with procrastination involves 
finding a way to willfully constrain our freedom of choice/action in the short run such 




better off  (Akerlof, 1991; Schelling, 1984). In other words, when what appears ‘optimal’ 
from a short-run perspective is not so when looked at from a longer-run perspective, 
constraints on our short-run freedom of action to pursue what we desire to do might be in 
fact a blessing in disguise.
14
 
What does this say about overcoming collective short-termism in climate change 
policy? At a cursory level, clashing long- and short-term preferences/interests in the 
realm of political decision-making is also commonplace. Governments the world over 
find their policy agendas shaped by pressing short-run political pressures that have urgent 
appeal for their constituencies, leaving little room to address long-term concerns that 
have little salience even if they are exceedingly important. Usually, political reforms that 
tackle long-term, structural problems become politically feasible only after a crisis.
15
 
Crises have this effect arguably because they reduce the relative salience of the short run 
by raising the public’s attention on the long-term issues and problems that need to be 
addressed, which in turn, constrains the ease with which political power can elect to 
avoid taking steps that are politically costly in the short run. Again, then, constraining 
short-run freedom of choice (for inaction) makes it easier to serve long-term objectives.  
 At a deeper, more general level, however, arguments that generalize from 
individual behavior require closer scrutiny for they can run into two types of problems. 
One is fallacy of composition. What is true for the individual need not be so for the group 
as a whole. In the simple one-shot prisoner’s dilemma game, for instance, individuals 
acting on what is optimal for them produce in the aggregate a suboptimal outcome. The 
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point – see Elster (1977). 
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other complication arises from the political and social determinants of collective agency. 
Even if a social optimum could be specified by simply aggregating individual preferences 
(the first problem), the nature of social divisions between groups/classes and the rules of 
political contention among them might render it unachievable (the second problem).  
It is not unusual for economists to ignore both problems – especially the second 
one, which is occasionally taken up by non-Walrasian economists, old and new, on the 
fringes of the profession (Ertürk, 2012).  Broadly speaking, we are inspired by this 
literature and draw on its insights to show in the next section how the consideration of a 
political/social variable (i.e., asymmetric power among countries/players) that bears on 
the second problem is integral to the outcome with respect to the first. The problem of 
radical uncertainty aside, cost-benefit analysis on climate change is not a purely technical 
exercise as economists tend to assume.  Political constraints can often prove decisive in 
altering what course of action is optimal for the powerful agents whose decision matters, 
and it turns out procrastination can indeed be a helpful analogy in discussing how 
collective short-termism can be overcome. Using simple game theory, we show that the 
existence of asymmetric power is tantamount to the removal or absence of a short-term 
constraint that could have potentially constrained developed countries’ freedom of choice 
in favor of inaction in the ecological short run and helped them act on their long-term 








1.6. Collective Action, Asymmetric Power, and Climate Change  
The power asymmetry between the poor and rich countries is a pervasive, 
essential characteristic of the world economy that shapes their multifaceted interactions, 
whether in the context of the global economy or the international political forums where 
terms of multilateral cooperation are typically negotiated. Yet, the ubiquitous nature of 
this asymmetry and the complex, multifaceted ways in which it manifests itself makes it 
hard to capture it in highly abstract, stylized economic models.  
Here, we try to deal with this challenge by working with a simple, parsimonious 
definition of power asymmetry in simple game theoretic terms as to whether one’s course 
of action has influence on the other players’ payoff.  The powerless can then be thought 
to face a one-dimensional prisoner’s dilemma as what they do, defect or not, has no 
influence on the more powerful player’s payoff. In our particular example, whether 
undeveloped countries choose mitigation (nondefection) or adaptation (defection) makes 
little difference to developed countries’ well-being, and thus individually, each 
developing country vis-a-vis developed countries as a group finds itself in a one-
dimensional prisoner’s dilemma. By contrast, when developed countries follow a policy 
of adaptation (defection), undeveloped countries are liable to suffer the ill effects of 
warming regardless of what they themselves do.  
In Figure 1.1, in (1A), both regions benefit from mitigation, whereas in (1B) 
developed countries get the superior temptation payoff from adaptation in contrast to the 
sucker’s payoff the undeveloped countries receive. The disagreement between the 
economists and climatologists revolves around the question as to whether the temptation 




perspective of the economists, (1B) is superior to (1A), because developed countries can 
continue to benefit from growth at least for a time without paying an ecological price. 
Given their longer-term perspective, the reverse holds true for climatologists. 
According to the climatologists, the likely outcome of adaptation in cell (1B) 
involves a death spiral. Warming rises beyond safe levels as powerful countries continue 
to externalize costs to the global commons. The vulnerable regions begin facing steeply 
rising ecological costs in the not too far-off future with prolonged droughts/floods and 
severe food shortages, both giving rise to heightened conflict over resources and an ever- 
increasing exodus of environmental/war refugees. In the meantime, as developed 
countries continue adapting to warming, some of the geophysical tipping points that 
accelerate warming are crossed. Warming settles on an unstable upward trajectory and 
the cost of mitigation proves inordinately higher than anticipated at the economically 
‘optimal’ level of warming.  
What could prevent this ascent towards the death spiral the climatologists fear is 
of course the question. This question is tantamount to asking what it would take for the 
powerful countries to act on their enlightened long-term self-interest and move from cell 
(1B) to (1A) in a timely manner. In our view, such a policy reorientation might entail a 
three-step process. The first involves a sea change in long-term preferences. Perhaps 
similar to how public attitudes towards smoking have evolved in the last few decades, we 
are arguably in the midst of a similar global transformation with respect to public 
awareness about the threat global warming poses for the future of the planet. As the 
public’s awareness of the gravity of the threat extends, the second stage would be the 




corrective action and the planet’s long-term well-being. This is the period of 
procrastination where the dynamic inconsistency between our short- and long-term 
preferences/interests results in the perpetual postponement of taking action.  Finally, the 
third stage is when the conflict is resolved in favor of our long-term objectives when 
constraints are placed on our short-term freedom of choice for inaction in the short run.  
  Note that there is an essential asymmetry between (1B) and (1A) in terms of their 
respective implications with regard to collective action. All-out adaptation in (1B) 
requires no cooperation and developed countries end up acting as a bloc (vis-a-vis 
undeveloped countries) by merely acting on their individual short-term interest. By 
contrast, mutual mitigation in (1A) requires developed countries to agree on a mutually 
binding set of restraints on their behavior and, for it to be effective, an ability to sanction 
defection among their midst.
16 
 
Returning briefly to our smoking example, the smoker who is trying to quit 
realizes that resisting smoking today is worthwhile only if she or he will be able to resist 
the temptation tomorrow as well. Otherwise, incurring the cost of not smoking today will 
be a wasted effort. If the smoker has some credible reason to expect that some constraint 
will impede his/her freedom to backslide tomorrow, it becomes so much easier to commit 
to not smoking today (Schelling, 2006). In a similar dynamic, any individual developed 
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 For instance, given the voluntary nature of the Kyoto Protocol, there were no 
repercussions when both Japan and Canada failed to meet their commitments, which also 
brings up the question whether effective international obeisance can ever be achieved 
without active U.S. involvement even though its willingness and even ability to exercise 
leadership is increasingly in doubt. Interestingly, there are some tentative signs that 
opinion on climate change might be beginning to change within the U.S. political elite. A 
new study just released by the bipartisan Risky Business Project (RBP, 2014), and backed 
by former Treasury Secretaries Hank Paulson, Robert Rubin, and George Shultz, 
examines the financial risks of global warming with an objective to transform how 




country that mitigates would incur costs in vain if other developed countries were to 
backslide on their commitment. Thus, in the absence of a constraint that can credibly be 
expected to impede backsliding by self and others, it becomes hard to commit to 
mitigation by any individual developed country in the first place. 
Given that they happen to be in regions that are not immediately vulnerable to 
warming, the developed countries’ crucial short-run freedom is their ability to externalize 
climate costs to the global commons. This externalization is made possible mainly by 
asymmetric power and, thus, the inability of undeveloped countries that are adversely 
affected in the present to deter it. It might be in the long-term interest of developed 
countries not to externalize climate costs, but the fact that they can makes it hard for each 
of them individually to commit to mitigation. When one powerful agent gives up its 
freedom to individually benefit from the weakness of the weak agents for some collective 
benefit, it has to be confident that the other powerful agents will do so as well. Otherwise, 
self-restraint simply enables another to profit at one’s expense.  This is the commitment 
problem of the powerful, and its solution requires a commitment device that would enable 
an individual powerful agent to credibly expect others to follow suit when it engages in 
self-restraint (Ertürk, 2011).  
If undeveloped countries, however, were capable of changing the payoff matrix of 
developed countries through some concerted action, it could potentially work as a 
commitment device that would make it easier for developed countries to act in their long- 
term interest. Stylistically, if a coalition of undeveloped countries could reduce the 
developed country payoff through some retaliatory action, both groups of countries 




then become the preferred option for developed countries not only in the long run but in 
the short run as well. Collective defection by undeveloped countries could in this instance 
perhaps refer to something much broader – an ability to speak in one voice on climate 
policy in international forums that energizes activists worldwide, raising political costs 
for developed countries in the home turf through striking, boycotting, and public 
shaming.  
To the extent that growing awareness of financial and economic costs associated 
with extreme weather patterns (IPCC, Core Writing Team, 2014)
17
 and the spillover 
effects of climate-related calamities that are likely to begin unfolding in undeveloped 
countries in the not  too distant future are transformed into salient politics at home, it is 
conceivable that the developed country payoff can change. If continued adaptation is 
thereby made politically and economically more costly by a block of undeveloped 
countries acting in concert, no individual developed country will be dissuaded from 
mitigation on account of fear of others’ probable defection.  
Clearly, whether undeveloped countries can act in concert, especially given that 
China and India might possibly favor delayed mitigation, and, if they did, what exact 
form their defection would take, are questions not easy to answer. At this point, we can 
only speculate. Though the comparison can be misleading, it is interesting to note that in 
the WTO’s Doha trade talks, undeveloped countries did manage to act in a block 
(Kleimann & Guinan, 2011). Their collective ability to cause the collapse of the talks is 
an instance where they managed to reduce the developed country payoff to mutual 
punishment – (2B) in Figure 1.2 -- which might yet prove to be the strategic prelude to 
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the achievement of a more equitable accord based on cooperation (1A) in the long run.
18
 
Coalition building (and maintenance) requires that players be able to (a) coordinate 
behavior, (b) monitor defection, and (c) bring political pressure to bear on defectors. 
Individual members can thereby not only coordinate and identify norm breakers more 
easily but also enforce rules within the group.
19
 
  There is also the possibility that developed countries can preempt or prevent any 
coalition building on the part of undeveloped countries by providing them incentives to 
break rank. Such a tactic would cause them to compete among themselves for what we 
might call the “scab’s payoff,” (2A) in Figure 1.3, in the form of financial and economic 
favors from developed countries in exchange for hosting their ecologically costly 
activities and legitimating developed countries’ actions and positions in international 
forums.
20
 The effect would be to keep most undeveloped countries locked in or return to 
(1B) in a one-dimensional prisoner’s dilemma. In fact, anything that lowers the ability of 
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 Climate policy is, of course, very different given that neither the terms nor the 
institutional framework of bargaining can yet be said to exist. Yet, future trade 
negotiations are likely to become increasingly enmeshed with environmental issues. Free 
trade agreements have been used on numerous occasions to dismantle environmental 
regulations at the local and national level (Klein, 2014, p. 69), and it is likely that they 
will continue to get in the way of efforts to address environmental concerns. On the other 
hand, while in principle, trade sanctions can potentially be effective in controlling carbon 
emissions, it is also true that environmental issues can be used opportunistically to raise 
entry barriers for developing countries in advanced markets (Esty, 2001). 
19
 As a colleague who worked at the UN for many years put it, “When developing 
countries want something they try to have everything out in the open and when developed 
countries want something they work behind closed doors.”  
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 See O’Brein and Leichenk (2000) for an extended discussion on how the 
financial/economic and environmental vulnerabilities of undeveloped countries can 





the powerless countries to form coalitions and deal with free riders in their midst will 
increase the probability of returning to the death spiral. 
 
1.7. Conclusion 
We have argued that IAMs ignore how asymmetric power can skew the calculus 
of developed countries towards delaying mitigation. The distribution of climate costs 
around the globe is not just a geographic given but also an attribute of asymmetric power. 
The freedom to externalize their emissions to the global commons makes it harder for 
developed countries to overcome short-termism, just as it incentivizes undeveloped 
countries to act in concert to deter the former from passing their climate costs onto them. 
Thus, to the extent undeveloped countries can succeed in coalition building and act in 
concert, they can potentially help developed countries overcome ‘short-termism’ and act 
in their enlightened long-term interests as well.  
Much of the policy discussion on climate change addresses the problem of 
controlling carbon emissions at a technical level, focusing narrowly on the instrument 
choice. Either emissions are to be capped at some level or the price of carbon is fixed 
through taxation. In the former approach, the quantity of carbon is fixed and its price 
varies with market demand, whereas in the latter, price is fixed and quantity varies when 
demand changes. The implications of these two basic approaches are then discussed in 
terms of their relative advantages and shortcomings, without, however, any real clarity on 
what the relevant criteria are. The usual utilitarian rubric economists traditionally use in 
choosing between different policy options is hardly satisfactory, at least when it comes to 




tends to slip back into the analysis by default, which in our view is a critical lacuna in this 
literature. 
Thus, the emphasis on the instrument choice ends up obscuring the more central 
problem of stipulating the normative and political underpinnings of collective welfare 
and choice. Two salient facts about climate change policy complicate the possibility of a 
neat separation between normative and positive analysis, a separation that comes natural 
to most economists. One, the policies that are taken (or not taken) today will have a 
decisive effect on the well-being of future generations, putting them possibly at peril; 
and, two, their costs and benefits are distributed very unevenly across agents currently 
alive per their relative position of power. Our discussion shows that the “optimal” policy 
is not independent of the outcome of the interaction of agents with asymmetric power, 
which in turn depends on the success of the power balancing efforts of disadvantaged and 
powerless agents acting on the basis not only of self-interest but also the strength of their 
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CONCEPTUALIZING ASYMMETRIC COSTS AND TIPPING POINTS: 
THE MACROECONOMIC AND CLIMATE 
CONFLUENCE 
 
This paper attempts to frame asymmetric costs and tipping points associated with 
climate science and the economics of climate change in a stock model of post-Keynesian 
origins. Post-Keynesian dynamic models rely on stylized facts rather than representative 
agent microfoundations to explain macroeconomic phenomena. In this paper, climate 
science and findings from the economics of climate change are used to determine 
macroeconomic dynamics of a stock system (signs within the Jacobian), with a focus on 
powerful and vulnerable regions with respect to the costs associated with climate change. 
The paper attempts to answer how asymmetric costs and tipping points should be 
conceptualized for modelers and the implications such a conceptualization might have for 
the economics of climate change. 
 
2.1. Introduction 
The challenges that anthropogenic climate change presents to policy makers and 




conclusions as to the potential future costs, the ability of technology to combat future 
changes, and, perhaps most meaningful, at what level we should stabilize the climate 
system.  Even more recent estimates (e.g., Nordhaus, 2010) using the integrated 
assessment modeling method (IAM), which is more pessimistic than previous cost 
estimates (Tol et al., 2003), still suggest allowing global average temperatures to rise by 
at least 3℃  from preindustrial levels.  Climatologists warn of crossing tipping points in 
the near future (prior to a 3℃ warming in many cases), which would lead to major 
ecological vulnerability and greatly increase the likelihood of an ecological crisis 
(Hansen, 2008; Hansen et al., 2011;  IPCC, Core Writing Team, 2007; IPCC, Core 
Writing Team, 2014).   
The goal of this paper is to depict the dynamics of an economic system with an 
optimum capital stock close to a climatic tipping point in a world of asymmetric climate 
costs and economic/political power.  In the second section, I will lay out some more 
recent estimates by both climatologists and economists of the future potential costs of 
climate change. These estimates lay the groundwork for assumptions to be made later on 
in the paper. Section 2.3 presents the structure of the model as well as explores the 










2.2. Climate Science and Economics 
2.2.1. The Future Costs of Climate Change 
The future costs of climate change are difficult to estimate because future 
warming is uncertain,
21
 and the impacts on economic activity are not immediately 
apparent outside of clearly climate-sensitive sectors, such as the agricultural and 
economic cost of disasters.  How much warming the Earth is in for is uncertain because it 
is not known exactly where climatic tipping points are or precisely what the climate 
sensitivity is (the amount of actual warming a specific amount of CO2 will cause).  
Another often-raised issue by the economists studying climate change is how societies 
will be able to adapt to the changes associated with climate change.  The easier it is for a 
society to cope with the negatives of climate change, the more incentive there is to delay 
mitigation. 
Nordhaus (2010) provides a baseline for the current estimation of the economics 
of climate change given the various policy scenarios being discussed.  In his 2010 paper, 
Nordhaus uses his RICE (regional integrated model of climate and the economy) model 
(Nordhaus & Yang, 1996), which is a regionally calibrated model to estimate the costs of 
five climate policy scenarios.  In his first scenario, he examines the costs associated with 
a policy that does not control for carbon.  In this scenario, emissions grow very fast, 
reaching 793 CO2 parts per million (ppm) by 2100 with a global average temperature 
gain of 3.5℃ by 2100 and 6.7℃ by 2200.  This prediction is validated by the 2007 IPCC 
predictions and also means devastation for much of the ecosystem.  
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 Nordhaus’s ‘optimal’22 scenario predicts emissions will remain fairly flat over the 
next 2 to 6 decades, peaking in 2045 at 10 GtC CO2 emitted per year.  This case imposes 
a 50% reduction of 2005 emissions in 100 years. ppm CO2 rises to 600 with the 
temperature rise peaking at 3℃ and then falling to 2.7℃ by 2300.23  Nordhaus notes that 
he is referring to CO2 ppm and not CO2 equivalent ppm, thus ignoring other greenhouse 
gasses and, in doing so, probably underestimating warming.  His peak of 3℃ warming 
associated with 600 ppm appears to be on the low end of the 2007 IPCC (the UN’s 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change) range; 3℃ warming given 600 ppm would 
be a good outcome for humanity given that stock of CO2.  Warming of 3℃ would 
probably produce an ice-free world, most likely facing strong positive warming 
geophysical feedbacks.  It is also important to note that this economically optimal path 
requires immediate action in the next few years and decades. 
Nordhaus’s “temperature-limited” case is based on the limiting of warming to 2℃ 
above preindustrial levels,
24
 which is the stated goal of the European Union, climate 
groups such as 350.org, and many others.  The RICE model predicts flat emissions 
initially and then rapidly declining emissions after the next few decades.  Emissions are 
cut by 50% by 2075 with ppm rising to 500 around 2050 and then declining and 
stabilizing around 450.  According to the RICE, warming hits 2℃ and the price of carbon 
reaches 904$/ton of CO2 by 2105 (again in 2005 dollars).  According to the 2007 IPCC, it 
is more likely that ppm between 450 and 500 will result in 3℃ warming rather than 2℃, 
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still does not seem to satisfy a James Hansen tipping point hypothesis. 
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with stabilized CO2 ppm of 450 equating to a 2.8 to 3.2℃ warming within the 15-85% 
probabilities.  This discrepancy might arise from focusing solely on CO2 versus CO2 
equivalent.
25
  Nordhaus highlights the difficulty in achieving the 2℃ limited warming 
goal: “imposing the 2℃ temperature constraint is quite costly, reducing the net benefit by 
almost half, because of the difficulty of attaining that target with so much inertia in the 
climate system” (Nordhas, 2010, p. 4).  
         All these estimates are still highly sensitive to the discount rate selected, as 
Nicholas Stern and others have pointed out (Azar & Sterner, 1996; Akerman et al., 2009; 
Pindyck, 2013; Stern, 2007). However, Nordhaus (2010) provides us with a fairly 
pessimistic estimate (for the economics of climate change that uses the standard 
integrated assessment model (IAM) methodology) as well as some key insights into the 
costs of climate change. If Nordhaus’s estimates are correct, it appears that maximizing 
capital stock would take humanity beyond where many believe climatic tipping points lie. 
 
2.2.2. Tipping Points and CO2 Dynamics 
Tipping points are nonlinearities in the climate system. Below tipping point 
thresholds, the climate system is sinking more radiant forces than it is emitting so the 
natural system acts as a sink for the global economy’s anthropogenic climate forcing. The 
Earth’s geophysical system is acting as a heat sink, preventing the full greenhouse effect 
from the CO2 produced by humans. Once tipping points are crossed, the natural system 
ceases to act as a sink and begins to reinforce warming and atmospheric CO2 
concentrations (ppm). One commonly referenced tipping point is the methane frozen in 
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the Arctic tundra. Once warming reaches a point where the tundra thaws, the frozen 
methane will be released into the atmosphere (methane is also a greenhouse gas).  Land 
use changes also contribute to this nonlinear dynamic in the natural CO2 system, 
destroying carbon sinks such as forests.   
Melting itself can be considered a tipping point. As melting occurs, it changes the 
Earth's surface reflectivity, known as surface albedo.  When the Earth’s surface is more 
reflective, warming will happen more slowly and the costs of warming will phase in more 
gradually and will be lower (it is assumed).
26
 If the Earth absorbs more heat as a result of 
a larger area of ice melting, warming will happen faster, and thus costs will hit economies 
in a less spread-out and smooth manner.   
Once enough of these positive feedback mechanisms are triggered, the natural 
CO2 system will no longer sink the radiant forces that human-generated CO2 causes. The 
natural system will begin to contribute greenhouse gases (GHG) and radiant forcing to 
the Earth’s climate system, which will provide an additional warming challenge for 
humanity on top of the regular economic activity contribution. If stopping further 
warming will cost the world economy, after positive feedbacks kick in, those costs will 
come with interest. 
 
2.2.3. Current ppm and Policy Towards Tipping Point Avoidance 
Climatologists stress not crossing such tipping points. Avoiding tipping points 
should drive the policy debate (Hansen, 2008; Hansen et al., 2008, Hansen et al., 2011; 
IPCC, Core Writing Team, 2007; IPCC, Core Writing Team, 2014), which means 
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stabilizing atmospheric CO2 levels at 350 ppm in the long run, avoiding staying above 
such levels for too long (as we currently are at 400 ppm), and limiting equilibrated 
warming to 2℃ above preindustrial levels (implementing dramatic climate change 
regulation today).  These suggestions might seem extreme to many economists familiar 
with the potential economic short-run implications, but Hansen et al. (2011) warn that 
there is still a great deal of uncertainty surrounding where safe levels are. The more we 
learn, the more sensitive the climate and tipping point dynamics seem to be. With this in 
mind, it is believed by many climatologists to be prudent to leave a margin of error and 
hold warming to 2℃ or lower if possible (which is associated with reducing atmospheric 
CO2 ppm and stabilizing it at 350 or likely lower levels).  
Modeling ecological catastrophes, such as an increased risk of mass extinction,
27
 
is very difficult for economists.  Much of the modern developed economy is “not reliant” 
in a monetary sense upon agriculture or ecological systems, which seems to be an 
economic accounting problem and not a reality in terms of the economic system not 
needing the ecosystem to survive and function.  Economists, even those using the general 
equilibrium framework, seem to be unable to place a significant economic cost on 
warming, leaving most economic studies to implement a partial equilibrium methodology 
for analyzing climate change costs, implying no significant spillover into global 
economic production.    
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 According to the 2007 IPCC report, a startling potential consequence of inaction is 
that, relative to a base period of 1980 to 1999, 20 to 30% of species assessed would likely 
face increased risk of extinction if increases in global average warming exceed 1.5 to 
2.5℃ above preindustrial levels (still in the safe zone and likely even with action today at 
this point).  If warming is allowed (or tipping points crossed that force warming to 





2.2.4. Positive and Negative Externalities: The Disproportionality of Costs 
 Not all changes associated with climate change are economically negative. Some 
warming might increase agricultural productivity in higher latitudes, creating a temporary 
benefit for some regions in cooler climate zones (Mendelsohn & Schlesinger, 1999; 
Mendelsohn et al., 2006). Many regions have hill-shaped climate response functions, 
which means that as anthropogenic warming initially increases, some areas will see 
longer growing seasons, fewer spring frosts, and a CO2 fertilization.
28
 These gains, 
however, are most likely temporary, because with continued warming these gains will be 
reversed with conditions that are too warm and exhibit more severe weather, including 
droughts and desertification. With continued warming, the gains will not really be gains, 
but payday loans against future costs.   
The distribution of costs in both time and space affects the economics of the 
estimation of what is optimal warming.  Some regions of the world, such as sub-Saharan 
Africa and other lower-latitude regions, are already on the declining side of the hill .They 
are already too warm and too dry – and thus are currently experiencing an economic drag 
associated with climate change. The irony is that these lower-latitude countries tend to be 
the lower-emitting regions, whereas the higher-latitude regions (the most likely to at least 
initially benefit from climate change or not bear as many costs) are the regions that emit 
the most CO2. For those vulnerable to climate change, the commons is already ruined. 
If massive economic costs hit regions without developed economies, these costs 
would be less relevant to the bottom line in the cost-benefit analysis.  If, for instance, the 
U.S. economy were 50% agriculturally based (as some African nations are) and also 
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 CO2 fertilization refers to the extra resources plants have for growing with higher 




likely to face deteriorating agricultural conditions the way sub-Saharan Africa is expected 
to, the ‘optimal’ warming would be much different (Cline, 2007; Tol et al., 2003).  Since 
climate costs are likely to hit economically marginalized regions more significantly in 
terms of scale to their economy, optimal global warming is likely to be higher.  The U.S. 
agricultural share of GDP is between 2 and 3% (Cline, 2007; Tol et al., 2003).  Less-
vulnerable regions will receive a free ride from the vulnerable and economically 
marginalized segments of the global economy. 
 
2.3. Two-Equation Model 
2.3.1. Conceptualizing Asymmetric Costs Within a Two-Equation Model 
Because of the way the costs associated with climate change are distributed across 
time and regional economies of the world, the economics of climate change ends up 
suggesting warmer optimal global temperatures. Costs associated with climate change are 
likely to impact the less-developed regions of the world first. Tol et al. (2003) suggest 
that sub-Saharan Africa and Southeast Asia will be the first and most significantly hurt. 
These impacts are due to the relatively warm temperatures they already have, given their 
lower latitudes, their higher dependencies on agriculture and climate-sensitive sectors, 
and their vulnerability to sea level rise. Larger, more developed economies are located in 
regions that are, for the most part, less vulnerable to climate change initially and therefore 
do not face immediate or direct costs at lower levels of warming. Larger, more-developed 
economies and regions also have better financing options for adaptive measures than their 
vulnerable, less-developed counterparts (Leichenko & O’Brien, 2008; O'Brien & 




These costs will disperse throughout the global economic system in time.  For 
now, the less-vulnerable regions are in the position of being able to emit without 
repercussions, whereas vulnerable regions face increasing costs and hardship now and 
into the foreseeable future.  This relative position of power from a climate change cost 
perspective is not modeled well in the economics of climate change (Ertürk & Whittle, 
2015). If this temporary lack of repercussions for the emitting behavior of powerful 
regions leads the climate system to cross tipping points, the system will be locked into an 
undesired positive feedback dynamic where warming continues with little human help 
(game over for growth).  
To ensure that these model dynamics are represented accurately requires starting 
with the big picture, the long-run stock dynamics.  Given the asymmetric costs and level 
of power that is clear in the world, we need to develop two models -- one model for 
vulnerable regions and another for powerful regions-- and place them in relation to one 
another. The models will show how the costs associated with the CO2 system should look 
as economic activity drives stock levels of CO2 higher and how the higher temperatures 
associated with the stock of CO2 begin to drag on the economy. 
 
2.3.2. Stylized Facts and Assumptions 
The following models will rely on stylized facts (Kaldor, 1961; Ocampo et al., 
2009, ch. 9) rather than using a representative agent and basing the Jacobian signs on 
microbehavior. The model will utilize our understanding of macroeconomics, climate 
science, and the economics of climate change literature to inform our assumptions of the 




and an environmental system, both of which will be phrased in economic terms (prices 
and quantities). Both the economic and environmental systems will be a function of the 
other. The dynamics of each of the various components and phase spaces will be solved 
following Gandolfo (2010,  ch. 18-21).  
 
2.3.3. The Dynamics of ppm 
If we were to look at the dynamics that climate scientist are trying to describe, we 
would discover a divergent system. The Earth's climate currently sits between two stable 
nodes, the Holocene equilibrium (preindustrial levels of CO2) and the equilibrium 
humanity is pushing for, presumably when most of the carbon in the ground is back in the 
atmosphere as a result of human activity. The tipping points climate scientists refer to are 
unstable nodes, not an attractor but a point where the pull from the Holocene and the pull 
to the new higher ppm equilibrium are in balance. For the purposes of this model, we will 
simplify the notion of tipping points to just one tipping point. This simplification might 
seem to overstate the tipping point argument, but from a dynamic modeling point of 
view, it seems to be correct. Once climatic tipping points are crossed, changing surface 
albedo, thawing of tundra, and changing deep-ocean CO2 content become push factors 
and provide additional climate forcing away from the Holocene equilibrium. 𝜑 will 
represent the concentration of atmospheric CO2 (ppm) and will be used from this point on 
to discuss dynamics within the model. 
The ppm dynamics will be simplified to avoid a full climatological model of 
emissions and feedbacks. It is important to remember that ppm concentration is the result 




climatic tipping point: however, the divergent dynamic of the climate system will not be 
important for the stock model to be developed in the next section. Only in the conclusion 
will the problems of the tipping point be reintroduced. What is important about equation 
2.1 is that the rate of CO2 accumulation (?̇?) is positively correlated with the level of CO2 
concentration (𝜑). The positive relationship between 𝜑 and ?̇? is a fundamental finding of 
the climate science literature (Hansen, 2008; Hansen et al., 2009, Hansen et al., 2011; 
IPCC, Core Writing Team, 2007; IPCC, Core Writing Team, 2014). At a low level of 𝜑, 
the climate system has room to absorb CO2 emission. The sinking of CO2 emission 
happens because of the dynamics discussed earlier such as plants, forests, and oceans. 
Since this is a simplified model of the climate system, the sinking behavior of the climate 





 >  0 
(2.1) 
 
The emission sinking is represented in Figure 2.1 by the section of the graph to 
the left of the ?̇? axis (H in Figure 2.1). Equation 2.1 is important for the stock model in 
that it is one component of an environmental subsidy that will be developed and explored 
within the model. For now we can assume that the climate system resides to the left of the 
?̇? = 0 axis and that humans still can make meaningful mitigation decisions. Tipping point 
?̇? = 0 will become important in the conclusion of the paper as free-riding by powerful 
regions allows for 𝜑 to continue to increase beyond globally beneficial levels, potentially 




a region of the climate where human decisions become less relevant since the climate 
system itself reinforces warming. Region (I) produces an uncooperative economic system 
and thus makes it much harder for humans to bring CO2 concentration back down.   
 
2.3.4. The Two-Equation Model 
 𝜀 represents the externalization cost of CO2. If the benefits of productively 
emitting CO2 outweigh the economic and environmental costs of emitting CO2, 𝜀 will be 
negative. Negative externalization costs can be interpreted as a positive subsidy for 
emitting CO2. If, on the other hand, the total costs of emitting CO2 are greater than the 
economic benefits of emitting CO2, then 𝜀 will be positive. Positive externalization cost 
can be interpreted as a positive tax. Figure 2.2 illustrates 𝜀 and how various values of 𝜀 
should be interpreted. 𝜀 = 0 implies that the total costs of CO2 emissions equal the total 
benefit of CO2 emissions.  
 
 𝜀(𝜑) =  𝐸𝑥𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝑜𝑓 𝐶𝑂2 (2.2) 
 
 𝜀 is defined as a function of 𝜑, meaning that the externalization cost of CO2 
depends on the level of CO2 concentration.  𝜀 depends on 𝜑  because of equation 2.1 and 
Figure 2.1. Since the environmental system sinks CO2 differently at different levels of 
concentration (𝜑), the amount of cost the economic system will bear from its emissions 
will vary with 𝜑. Equation 2.1 defines the manner in which the environmental system 
sinks CO2 emissions. The higher the 𝜑, the less 𝜑,̇  implying there are fewer emissions 




Equation 2.3 illustrates the fundamental finding of the economics of climate 
change. The externalization costs of CO2 emissions (𝜀) are positively correlated with the 
level of concentration 𝜑 (Ackerman, 2013; Cline, 1991; Mendelsohn et al., 1999; 
Mendelsohn et al., 2006;  Nordhaus, 1992, 2007, 2010, 2013; Nordhaus & Yang, 1997; 
Pindyck, 2013; Stern, 2007; Tol et al., 2003). As 𝜑 rises, so does the economic cost of 
emitting CO2 (𝜀). Figure 2.3 illustrates this example. When the climate system is at a low 
𝜑, we know from expression one that the climate system is sinking a large amount of 
CO2 emission. The large level of sinking at a low value of 𝜑 provides a subsidy to the 
economy by lowering the externalization cost of CO2 emissions (E in Figure 2.3). The net 
effect of the climate system’s sinking of CO2 is that the benefits outweigh the cost of CO2 
emission and thus generate net negative costs (𝜀). At higher levels of 𝜑, the climate 
system is no longer sinking enough CO2 emission to make the economic benefits 
outweigh the economic environmental costs, thus generating positive (𝜀). At high levels 
of 𝜑 (F in Figure 2.3), the climate system is no longer providing a subsidy to the 
economic system;  instead, the positive 𝜀 can be interpreted as a tax on economic activity 







Of note at this point is that 𝜑 ̇ ≠  𝜀 ̇, and 𝜀 = 0 does not correspond to the climatic 
tipping point. All that is required to generate the subsidy at low levels of 𝜑 and the tax at 
high levels of 𝜑 is that equations 2.1 and 2.3 hold. Since both expressions are nearly 




appropriate to make the assumptions of equations 2.1 and 2.3. Also eqautions 2.1 and 2.3 
mean that humans can make meaningful cost-benefit decisions. If tipping points are 
crossed, these decisions might be meaningless as the climate system drags the economy 
kicking and screaming towards disaster. 
The regions (G) in Figure 2.3 represent a post-tipping-points world where the 
level of 𝜑 has increased beyond the threshold climate science is warning about. Once the 
economic system crosses from (F) to (G), costs associated with climate change grow 
dramatically, and the stability of this stock model falls apart. It may be appropriate to 
interpret (G) as the regions where economies begin to have serious production problems 
associated with increasingly out-of-human-control climate costs. The increase in 𝜑 
caused by the climate system itself (which happens in regions (G)) is not associated with 
a benefit, i.e., a productive use of carbon-based fuels. The extra costs brought on the 
economy after the climatic tipping point is crossed that are solely associated with positive 
feedback within the natural system are pure costs to the economy.  
Equation 2.4 begins the development of a differential system where K̇ is the 
growth rate of the capital stock. Capital accumulation (equation 2.4) is a function of the 
current capital stock and the externalization costs of CO2. At an initial low stock level of 
𝜑, producing more 𝜑 has beneficial economic outcomes, as the costs from the additional 
𝜑 are relatively low compared to the benefits received. In addition to the cost-benefit 
calculus being in favor of 𝜑 production when the stock of 𝜑 is low, the climate system 






?̇? = 𝑓[𝐾, 𝜀(𝜑)]  (2.4) 
 
Equation 2.5 shows the externality cost dynamics. 𝜀 ̇  represents the accumulation 
of 𝜀 as a function of the K and 𝜀. This isocline represents the diminishing cost sinking 
and eventually cost increasing dynamics of the natural system. The 𝜀 ̇ isocline can be 
regarded as the point where CO2 emissions are neither adding costs nor sinking costs. 
The costs can, however, be externalized regionally at this point as will be discussed in 
later sections. 
 
𝜀̇ = ℎ[𝐾, 𝜀(𝜑)]  (2.5) 
 
Equations 2.6 and 2.7 represent the Jacobians for the models for both the vulnerable 














Equation 2.8 represents the dynamic theory (Harrod, 1939) of the economic 
system and will always have a negative sign, with growth of the capital stock fluctuating 
around the warranted growth rate. This assumption makes sense since we do not typically 




2.8 could change in the future with enough stress placed on the ecosystem, but for now 




< 0  
(2.8) 
 
Equation 2.9 shows us 𝜀's effect on 𝜀 ̇  is negative in this model. This negative 
relationship is a behavioral economic assumption that represents cost minimization by 
economies. Equation 2.9 represents economies wanting to take advantage of the 
environmental subsidy (by emitting) and a desire to avoid the environmental tax (by 
reducing emissions). When 𝜀 is low, implying negative externalization costs of CO2 (or 
environmental subsidy for emissions), 𝜀 ̇ is high; this can be interpreted as meaning the 
desire to increase costs is very high when costs are negative. In other words, economies 
want to accumulate negative costs. When 𝜀 is high, the externalization costs of CO2 are in 
excess of the benefits of productively using CO2; therefore, a cost minimizing economy 
would desire to decrease accumulation of positive costs. The 𝜀 ̇ = 0 isocline is the point 
where the forces of costs minimization are in balance. Figures 2.4 and 2.5 show the 







Three assumptions go into the sign of equation 2.9. First, equation 2.1 states that 




science. Equation 2.3 states that there is a positive relationship between 𝜀 and 𝜑, which 
means economic environmental costs rise with CO2 concentration. Equations 2.1 and 2.3 
create externalization costs that are negative at low 𝜑 and positive with externalization 
costs of CO2 at high concentrations of 𝜑. The natural system creates the economic 
subsidy or tax. The final assumption for equation 2.9 is that economies will try to 
accumulate environmental subsidy (negative 𝜀) and diminish environmental tax (positive 
𝜀) in a manner consistent with standard cost minimization.  
With equation 2.10 we see that, depending on whether a region is vulnerable or 
not to the costs of climate change, the effect of 𝜑 on capital accumulation will be 
different. Regions where capital accumulation is negatively affected by increases in 𝜀 
have a negative sign for equation 2.10. In the global commons context, a negative sign 
will reflect a region that is being exploited by the powerful as 𝜑 increases. Regions where 
capital accumulation is positively affected by increases in 𝜀 have a positive sign for 
equation 2.10, meaning the cost-benefit calculus is still favoring capital accumulation. 
Powerful regions are not yet experiencing enough climate change costs for those costs to 
outweigh their benefits of continued capital accumulation and transfer costs within the 







The sign for the capital stock's effect on the position of 𝜀 ̇ equation 2.11 is always 




far as altering the positive relationship between 𝜑  and ?̇? 29. However, the 𝜀 ̇ isocline, as 
we will see, will be in a different location for both the vulnerable and powerful regions, 
as their costs dynamics will vary based on their regional vulnerability and the makeup of 







These dynamics leave us with two basic Jacobians. The first one shows the 
dynamics associated with the powerful regions.  
 





The Jacobian for the vulnerable regions (equation 2.13) is signed below, where 
the costs of increasing 𝜑 are larger than the benefits. They are also not large enough 
emitters to shape the global 𝜀 growth path.   
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 This is a simplification that skews the results of the model in favor of capital 
accumulation and not climate damages. More recent work by climate scientists (Hansen 
et al., 2011) shows that the speed at which ppm is increased matters, and therefore the 
economy might have a significant effect when the positive warming feedbacks from 




2.3.5. Phase Space Analysis 
Figure 2.6 shows the global phase space. Below the 𝜀 ̇  isocline, the value of this 
axis is negative, representing a negative cost for externalizing CO2. Emitting activity has 
a subsidy placed on it by a forgiving climate system. Above the 𝜀 ̇  isocline, the value of 
the axis is positive, representing a positive cost for externalizing CO2. Any emissions 
above the 𝜀 ̇  isocline will have a natural tax. 
The horizontal axis represents the total capital stock. Movements to the right 
along the axis represent a larger amount of capital in the economic system. Technological 
change can be represented as shifts in the K̇ isocline to the right, increasing the given 
capital stock at any particular 𝜑 (more on this in a later section).  
Capital accumulation, K̇ in Figure 2.6, is a nonlinear function as increasing ppm 
initially is correlated with increasing capital stock, but at a decreasing rate because of a 
beneficial cost structure. Eventually, increasing 𝜑 begins to shrink the capital stock as 
damages from warming are taking out more economic wealth than emitting is generating 
(above the 𝜀 ̇  isocline).  The economic system’s tendency is to continue to grow; 
however, the increasing costs associated with higher 𝜑 are an increasing drag on the 
economic system.  Continued growth of 𝜑 undermines the growth of the capital stock and 
eventually causes losses in the capital stock, not just slowing accumulation.  The 
tendency for a slowing and then shrinking economic stock can be associated with a loss 
of productivity in climate-sensitive sectors, costs of worsening natural disasters such as 
Hurricanes Sandy or Katrina, large-scale extinctions, loss of low lying cities, or lowering 




The economic stock is stable around the K̇ isocline, the warranted capital stock 
(Harrod, 1939). The stable path that makes the most sense is the K̇ isocline, with costs 
adjusting as the economy grows. The 𝜀 ̇ isocline is also a stable path, but this path does 
not make much sense as far as the economics of climate change is concerned since we see 
a clear movement of 𝜑 and 𝜀 over time. Point (A) represents the environmental cost 
minimizing point for the globe. This is the point where the global economy would arrive 
(following the ?̇? isocline) that would maximize capital stock without incurring an 
environmental tax but taking full advantage of the environmental subsidy. Point (B) 
represents the maximum attainable capital stock of the global economy. Point (B) does 
not mean that the benefits of the capital stock at point (B) are shared globally; in fact the 
benefits of going from (A) to (B) are almost assured to be hoarded by some at the 
expense of others. Point (A) does not equal point (B) globally because of regional and 
economic asymmetric costs.  
The movement (C) depicted along the K̇ isocline from (A) to (B) is what 
Nordhaus (2010) predicts and what those countries that are less vulnerable to climate 
change would like to see. However, if the world did not have asymmetric costs and 
asymmetric power, the movement (C) would not be sustainable but for a brief period that 
would inevitably be followed by a corresponding period of decay back to (A). It is 
because of an asymmetric ability to exploit the commons and asymmetric costs of climate 







2.3.5.1. Powerful Regions Phase Space 
Figure 2.7 provides us with a look at the phase space of the powerful regions. 
This phase space differs from the global phase space in two key ways. The first is the 
position of the 𝜀 ̇ isocline for the powerful regions is at a higher level of 𝜑, and thus the 
externalization cost of CO2 is lower for the powerful at any given level of 𝜑 than it is for 
the vulnerable or globally. 𝜀 ̇  (powerful) equals zero at a higher temperature or 𝜑 than the 
𝜀 ̇  (global) since the economies of powerful regions are less reliant on the ecosystem and 
have a geographical advantage compared to the rest of the world. The second way the 
phase space of the powerful regions is different from the global is point (B), the 
economic maximum, is a stable node. This system will converge on (B) eventually; the 
problem is that this is at a higher level of 𝜑 and thus flirting with crossing the ?̇? isocline 
(more on this in a later section).  
 
2.3.5.2. Vulnerable Regions Phase Space 
In Figure 2.8, we see the phase space of the vulnerable regions. They are faced 
with a lower 𝜀 ̇  isocline than either the powerful regions or the global. Their economic 
optimum (V) may have already been passed given that they are already too hot and too 
dry (Cline, 2007; Tol et al., 2003) and are likely to face only worsening economic 
conditions going forward. Even though a vulnerable region’s phase space might look like 
Figure 2.8 if the rest of world’s phase space does not, there is little vulnerable regions can 
do to maintain the position of (V). They are likely to be pulled upwards in the phase 
space by the actions of other more dominant systems.  The vulnerable regions might also 




changes in 𝜑 and 𝜀. The vulnerable regions do not really have a choice between 
mitigation and adaptation. They have only one option individually: adapting to the 
powerful regions’ emission behavior (Erturk & Whittle, 2015). 
 
2.3.6. Dynamics, Comparisons, and the Commons 
All systems are stable with stable paths along the K̇ and 𝜀 ̇  isoclines.  For all 
systems (global, powerful, and vulnerable), the economic system is convergent around 
some economically regulated growth rate, 𝜕𝐾̇̇ 𝜕𝐾 < 0⁄ . The externalization costs of CO2 
are stable around 𝜀 ̇ = 0 due to cost minimization (𝜕𝜀 ̇ 𝜕𝜀 < 0 ⁄ ). The difference in these 
systems is the relationship with the global commons and how the environmental system 
impacts the economic system; for the powerful regions, the environmental system is still 
a positive in the economic system, whereas for vulnerable regions, it is negative, 
𝜕?̇? 𝜕𝜀 >< 0⁄ .  
In Figure 2.9, we can begin to understand how the movement (C) from (A) to (B) 
occurs in Figure 2.6. The 𝜀 ̇  isocline for the powerful regions is higher than the 𝜀 ̇ isocline 
for the global system, meaning that the powerful regions face lower costs for emitting 
CO2 at a higher 𝜑. Since the powerful regions have a beneficial relationship with the 
global commons, the movement (C) represents their ability to externalize the additional 
costs to the commons. Moving from (A) to (B) is simply a matter of the powerful regions 
shifting costs via the commons to avoid facing the negative costs associated with crossing 
the vulnerable 𝜀 ̇  and the global 𝜀 ̇ . The phase space in this system is still dominated by 
the powerful regions’ K̇ and 𝜀 ̇  isoclines; the stable node is (B). Because of asymmetric 




In Figure 2.10, we see the dilemma of the vulnerable regions. The vulnerable 
regions’ economic optimum is at point (V), which is already below (A). They are today 
too hot and too dry and would still be exploited via the commons by (n) even if humanity 
avoided crossing the global (A). The vulnerable regions individually have no control over 
their climate destiny. Point (V) is thus completely off the table, and these regions are left 
to adapt to the decisions made by the rest of the world. If the powerful regions are able to 
push their system to (B), the vulnerable regions will be further exploited via the 
commons by an additional (n’). Even in Figure 2.10, (B) is the stable node since the only 
system that has control over its climate destiny is that of the powerful regions.  
From Figure 2.10, we see that in a world with asymmetric costs and power, any 
aggregation via an IAM or other cost-benefit tool assumes a level of exploitation of the 
vulnerable regions. Even an IAM such as that of Stern (2007) that may produce an 
optimum of (A) assumes exploitation of the vulnerable regions and a redistribution of 
climate costs from those most able to absorb such costs to those least able to absorb such 
costs.  
 
2.3.7. The Problem of Tipping Points 
The ability to push 𝜑 to higher levels by the powerful’s free-riding results in a 
potentially dangerous dynamic.  Until now, we assumed ?̇?  ≠  𝜀 ̇ . We can still make this 
assumption, but consider what happens if (?̇? = 0) is crossed. The vertical position of the 
𝜀 ̇  isocline matters a great deal. If the tipping point (?̇? = 0) is above the point at which 
the economic system is maximized (B), then there is some hope of avoiding a climate 




and environmental economic cost minimization). The closer (?̇? = 0) is to (B), the higher 
the risk of overshooting (?̇? = 0) and leaving a cooperative environmental system. If 
(?̇? = 0) is below (B), as many in the climate science community are warning about, cost 
shifting by the powerful becomes a very dangerous game that may lead to continually 
rising Y but with an environmental dynamic that is now uncooperative. Economies might 
want to mitigate and limit the growth of environmental costs, but they may be unable to 
alter the trajectory of 𝜑 and ?̇?. If the world were in a situation that did not have 
asymmetric climate costs, humanity would face increasing positive 𝜀 in a region of the 
phase space with a more cooperative natural system. The lower (𝜀 ̇ = 0) is, the more 
likely humans are to avoid crossing (?̇? = 0), which may produce an ecological 
catastrophe that drags the economy down with it (region (G) in Figure 2.3).  Since 
humanity is stuck with asymmetric environmental costs associated with climate change, 
humanity is also stuck with incentives to push 𝜑 higher. 
A crisis of capitalism seems likely to emerge when the ?̇? > 0 causes out-of-
human-control rising environmental costs with no costless solutions. At this point, 
increasing economic activity and dealing with the economic crisis by generating demand 
will lead to increasing emissions that will undermine any economic gains in the long run. 
Where accumulation ceases, it is unlikely that regular economic theory is sufficient to 
understand the problems facing the global economy. It is more likely that crisis theories 
become more applicable. It is hard to believe that the economic system functions 








Figure 2.11 presents an interesting potential extension of this framework. If we 
relax some of the assumptions of the model presented above, we can start to see some 
interesting dynamics that could emerge. If we remove the assumption of only one 
environmental tipping point but maintain that from a cost function perspective, there is 
still some 𝜀 ̇  isocline that represents stable costs with all of the aforementioned dynamics, 
and we might see a movement (D).  
As the environmental system crosses its tipping points (one at a time, for instance, 
moving along 𝜑), we would probably see the 𝜀 ̇  isocline lower, as the stable cost 
dynamics of the phase space would have to account for the increasing costs of crossing 
the latest environmental tipping point. Figure 2.11 requires not only relaxing the single 
hypothetical tipping point assumption but also introducing time in a meaningful manner. 
The order of events would become important, and thus the system would take on a path 
dependency, not unlike the actual climate and macroeconomic systems. An additional 
difficulty that would be required to work out would be the issue of 𝜕𝜀 ̇ 𝜕𝐾 = 0⁄  no longer 
equaling zero.  
These mechanics have yet to be worked out, but they do seem quite interesting 
and suggestive that overshooting the Earth’s carbon budget requires not only a return to 
the stable emission levels of a pre-overshoot world (probably less than A), but also the 
implementation by humanity of emissions restrictions beyond such a point, to (A’). If 
climate stability is a goal in the future, any trips across the stable point could imply long-




2.4.2. The Collective Action Problem and Closing Thoughts 
The collective action problem illustrated clearly in Figures 2.9 and 2.10 shows the 
precariousness of society’s situation. Pursuing a policy of maximizing economic 
costs/benefits by powerful regions leads the world closer to the bad half of CO2 
divergence (?̇? > 0), and any gains are likely temporary and not shared. Going from  (A) 
to (B) is easy once asymmetric costs are understood. Going in the opposite direction 
seems to be a much more troubling macroeconomic dynamic. Economists are concerned 
with the maximum achievable capital stock (B). However, the ethical concerns about the 
levels of international exploitation are serious when one goes from (A) to (B). Vulnerable 
regions are already disadvantaged: (n) in Figure 2.10. Further exploitation by the 
powerful regions (n’) does not seem justified given the powerful regions are already 
typically high-income regions that gain little in terms of quality of life by increasing their 
material wealth. Redistribution of material wealth down the international income scale 
and stabilizing the climate system at 2℃ or less is the only justifiable course of action.   
The only means the vulnerable regions have to redress this level of exploitation is 
coordinated collective action. The vulnerable regions acting as a bloc could use trade 
sanctions, embargos, and public shaming to impose the costs dumped into the global 
commons on the powerful regions. These actions may be enough for the powerful regions 
to readjust their economic optimum and prevent humanity from over-drawing our carbon 
budget. A readjustment of the powerful regions’ economic optimum could also force 
economists studying climate change to analyze what kind and how much redistribution of 
power and capital are required to reduce the impacts of moving to a safe economic size 




technologies not only increases efficiencies but also might lead to substantial decoupling 
with large enough economies of scale to facilitate a complete end to carbon-based fuels. 
Any solutions that prevent carbon overreach will require an antineoliberal movement to 






2.5 Appendix  
2.5.1. Technical Change 
The economic system's position relative to the Ẏ isocline is very much dependent 
upon the technique of production and the technology used.  If, for instance, reliable low-
energy nuclear reactions (LENR) became an economic reality, then we would be taken 
off this phase space entirely.  If the usage of carbon-based fuel is decoupled from CO2 
emission to a large extent through the use of more efficient and lower cost renewables, 
the economic stock optimum will be attainable with less ppm, as Figure 2.12 shows (B) 
to (B*).  
The gain illustrated in Figure 2.12 assumes a small or even nonexistent rebound 
effect
30
; such a movement would require technological gain coupled with taxation 
policies to remove the incentive to increase consumption of CO2.
31
 Thus, technology 
alone is not going to solve this problem, and there is a need for political action (Greening, 
Greene, & Difigilo, 2000). Only the most optimistic would believe that technological 
game changers will arrive in time to avoid having to make some hard choices as to 
mitigation and adaptation policies as we are already above the safe Ẏ line.  Nuclear 
power will have to overcome serious public image and safety/cost problems.  LENR is 
viewed by most as science fiction.
32
 Renewables have serious problems with storage, 
reliability, and costs. Therefore, it seems like a grand policy will be required even for the 
most optimistic. 
 
                                                 
30 Rebound effect dynamics are estimated in Figure 2.12. 
31
 These dynamics are estimated in Figure 2.13. 
32
 Even if NASA and SPAWAR (Marwan et al., 2010; SPAWAR), Szpak, Mosier-Boss, 




2.5.2. Rebound Mechanics 
 
Figure 2.13 represents what a pure rebound effect (Jevon’s law) might look like. 
The technological change that produces resource efficiency gains also generates a lower 
cost per unit of production, since the energy input will go further in the production 
process. These cost dynamics can generate greater consumption of resources than 
previously. For example, improvements in the steam engine led to greater coal 
consumption in 19
th
-century England.  
For the climate crisis, a contemporary example is the increasing fuel efficiency of 
automobile engines, which has not led to a decrease in year over year ppm production by 
transportation but rather allowed driving to remain a very cheap means of transportation 
in spite of rising fuel costs. In this case, we would expect an outward shift in the K̇ 
isocline. The economic system should be able to achieve equivalent or greater output at 
point (A) than previously at point (B*) and still be ecologically safe. However, the 
efficiency gains lead to greater consumption of the resource rather than less as the 
economic maximum is now at B. Instead of going from (B*) to (A) as the engineer 
intended the system to go, the economic system ends up at (B), producing more ppm than 
previously. 
In their article on the rebound effect, Greening, Greene, and Difigilo (2000) point 
out that policy will always be required along with resource-efficient technological 
change. Such policies, such as a carbon tax, will discourage increased use of the resource 
due to a lower unit cost, and the efficiency gains will still have a positive effect on the 
economy. We can see this with Figure 2.14, a phase diagram where the K̇ isocline 




shifts the K̇ isocline down, creating a situation where the economics optimum is at (B 
tax) and ecologically safe. The efficiency gains from the technological change allow the 
economy to be larger in areas with less of an impact on ppm, thus increasing the capital 
stock and not expanding areas of the economic system that place an additional burden on 
the climate system.  
 
2.5.3. Growth or No Growth? 
There is the question of how this model fits into the growth/no-growth debate. 
This model is only a no-growth model under a specific set of circumstances. If we 
assume no technological improvement in efficiency or a very strong rebound effect, then 
it is a no-growth model. The other assumption would be that population grows faster than 
the decoupling rate that technology provides. Both arguments are legitimate. Population 
seems to be a primary driver of climate change and is also so taboo for politicians that it 
is unlikely any policy will be implemented on a global scale. We do see relative 
decoupling in the global macrodata, but we do not see an absolute decoupling that 
suggests an active rebound effect combating efficiency gains over the past 30 years 
(Jorgenson & Clark, 2012). These two exceptions seem to have been the sticking points 
of the growth/no-growth debate for years now (Daly, 1974; Solow, 1973), and it is not 
likely this model will do anything to settle the debate. 
The main insight of this model remains intact regardless of whether or not it is a 
growth or no-growth model. The policy question from an economics perspective needs to 
be reframed from one of maximizing growth and potential capital stock to one of 




As technology changes or population changes, those tipping points stay the same, and 
thus the economic problem becomes one of optimizing given a constraint (staying in the 


























Figure 2.5. The dynamics of 𝜺 and 𝜺 ̇ . 
 
 





Figure 2.7. The powerful regions. 
 
 





Figure 2.9. The powerful regions’ relation to the global. 
 
 






Figure 2.11. A dynamic cost curve. 
 
 






Figure 2.13. Pure rebound effect. 
 
 






BAYESIAN UPDATING ROLLING REGRESSION ANALYSIS OF 
DECOUPLING DATA: 1970-2010 
 
3.1. Introduction 
 This paper explores the relationship between economic activity and global CO2 
emissions using new data and a methodology new to the field. Capitalist economic 
growth is inherently harmful to the environment and leads to the depletion of natural 
resources and the exploitation of the global commons. It is vital to understand this 
process as much as possible and determine where changes can be made to this basic 
dynamic. As macroeconomics continues to develop a theoretical understanding of global 
environmental problems, empirical work is required to lay a foundation of knowledge. 
The most basic relationship that is studied is decoupling; how does the link between 
environmental degradation and macroeconomic growth change over time? Proper 
estimates of decoupling are useful not only for theoretical macroeconomics but also for 
practical global environmental policy, which relies on good estimates of baseline 
behavior. Decoupling refers specifically to getting more economic ‘good’ for less 
environmental ‘bad’. This is a very intuitive idea, as with increases in technology, 




time. There are, however, economic forces to contend with and bouts of strong economic 
growth, which might make this rather intuitive concept empirically less relevant.  
Climate change is the ultimate example of the ecological dynamic of economic 
growth. Industrialization requires industrialized power generation. Modern (the past 150 
years) power generation, which has fueled the explosion in economic growth, has relied 
on using up natural resources. Climate experts advocate 3-6% per year reduction in CO2 
emissions. CO2 reduction would be a large enough challenge on its own if the economy 
were not growing, but then consider that the global economy grows by 2-3% a year. This 
paper continues the examination of decoupling CO2 growth from economic growth, using 
global times series data, to shed light on the robustness of decoupling analysis and open 
up new avenues for macroeconometric research. This paper employs a Bayesian updating 
rolling regression to access the stability of the CO2 to GWP (gross world product) 
relationship. Three models trace the same dynamic through the data. A massive 
decoupling event occurred in the mid-90s as a result of the collapse of the Soviet Union, 
followed by a surge of carbon intensity in the 2000s with the rise of China and India. 
These large exogenous shocks to the data leave some doubt as to whether or not 
decoupling is occurring at all as the parameter estimates in the mid-2000s are roughly the 
same as the estimates prior to the collapse of the Soviet Union.  
 
3.2. Decoupling Studies: Insights and Expectations 
The environmental Kuznets curve (EKC) literature is well developed at this point 
(Grossman & Krueger, 1991; Stern, 2004). The EKC theory “is a hypothesized 




capita” (Stern, 2004, p. 1419). Empirically, this theory predicts that as income per capita 
rises from an initially low and underdeveloped state, environmental degradation will rise. 
Economies are moving from low-energy-intensive, low-pollutant-intensive, agriculturally 
based production to higher-energy and pollution-intensive production, and 
manufacturing. This part of the hypothesis is not controversial. Many within the field of 
ecological economics and even Marxist ecological critiques of capitalism would agree 
with the theory so far (Daly, 1997; Foster, Clark, & York, 2010; Li, 2008). EKC theory 
further predicts that as income per capita rises, economic growth has a smaller impact on 
the environment. The reasoning from the EKC literature is that with the extra income per 
capita, society is now affluent enough to value environmental quality as well as other 
economic needs. The economy transitions to an “information-based” economic structure 
rather than a manufacturing structure, thus leaving a smaller environmental footprint. 
This decoupling of the impact of economic growth on environmental degradation is the 
controversial part. According to Stern (2004), this claim has not been grounded in 
reliable econometric empirical work.   
The EKC literature has primarily utilized panel data methods, which present an 
unclear picture (Kijima, Nishide, & Ohyama, 2010; Stern, 2004). Panel methods are used 
primarily to capture different economies at various stages of economic development and 
income. Using a panel shows whether or not countries begin to value environmental 
quality more and more as the economy develops and attains a higher level of affluence. 
The econometric results are quite sensitive to the countries selected to make up the panel 




‘information-based economy,’ it off-shores its dirty manufacturing processes rather than 
decoupling.  
If an analyst selects developed countries that are off-shoring dirty manufacturing 
processes and does not select the developing countries that are picking up those dirty 
manufacturing processes, it may appear that decoupling is occurring. In reality, this is just 
a shifting of environmental degradation around the world. For instance, dirty 
manufacturing processes in China are supporting consumption in the U.S.  U.S. 
consumers may still be very dirty, but much of the environmental degradation they are 
responsible for is transported to China.  
For the purposes of climate change, the development of an individual country is 
of little consequence. Even if the EKC theory were correct, humanity might not have 
enough time to wait for all countries to develop sufficiently to begin significant 
decoupling of CO2 and GDP growth.
33
 Kijima et al. (2010) point out that there is also an 
assumption in much of the theoretical EKC literature that both sides of the hypothesized 
environmental degradation/income per capita curve are symmetrical. It seems likely that 
the curve would be steeper in the beginning phase of economic development when 
incomes are low and capital formation is in its early stages and much flatter for the 
developed phase when lifestyles are focused on high consumption, meaning that a much 
longer time and higher income would be required to reverse environmental degradation.  
The contributions this paper makes to this literature are starting from a global 
time series rather than panel data perspective and explicitly discussing the various 
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 Steinberger and Roberts (2010) estimate with the human development index that there 
is time to achieve increases in HDI and that decoupling can go hand in hand with 
development. In contrast, some suggest, “without systemic changes, green goals and full 




elements and scale of uncertainty involved with empirical decoupling studies. This 
paper’s analysis does not suffer as much from country selection bias, as the focus is on 
global aggregates. This aggregation goes a long way toward eliminating the off-shoring 
problem in much of the EKC literature while sacrificing country-specific 
idiosyncrasies.
34
 Aggregation has trade-offs and is far from perfect, but it is better at 
measuring global decoupling and providing insight into global policies. Because our 
analysis focuses on global aggregates, it will be implicitly dealing with total levels of 
pollution rather than pollution per capita. Per capita emissions are vital for policy work 
and understanding the underlying distributional dynamics of the global commons. Per 
capita emissions have their place in empirical analyses that retain country-specific 
characteristics.  However, using a global time series washes out the country-specific 
characteristics such as emissions per capita, so including per capita emissions in this 
analysis would not add any information.  
In the context of climate change, relative decoupling is a slower growth rate of 
CO2 or greenhouse gases (GHG) than the faster growth rate for the economy (GDP or 
GWP). Relative decoupling is clearly a welcome occurrence, but it is also potentially 
irrelevant if the ecosystem requires a stop to emission growth altogether.
35
 With relative 
decoupling, as the economy grows in size so does the stock of pollution even if both 
variables are decoupling from one another. This is a large problem for climate change: 
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 Eric Sjöberg commented that this does not, however, completely eliminate the ‘off-
shoring’ effect since it is likely data collected from less-developed countries are less 
reliable than data collected in developed countries. If an advanced economy off-shores 
some ‘dirty’ processes, there is likely a loss of data, or at least less precise data.  
35
 Antal (2014) discusses estimates ranging from 3-6% year over year declines in CO2 
being required to avoid potentially devastating climatic tipping points. The decline in 




the absolute level of global GHG pollution needs to come down (currently greater than 
400 ppm). This paper’s data analysis speaks directly to these issues of scale and global 
impact.  
Some empirical work looking at GHG emissions finds theoretical ambiguity. 
Jorgenson and Clark (2012), using an extensive panel study constructed with care to 
avoid off-shoring effects, find evidence of some relative decoupling along with evidence 
of “mini-cycles” of decoupling and intensification over time while overall CO2 continued 
to rise over time. Steinberger and Roberts (2010), using a previous iteration of the CO2 
data that are used in this paper, find evidence of decoupling of CO2 from Human 
Development Index (HDI) indicators; however, their study does not include any 
significant robustness checks. Knight and Schor, in an OECD panel study, report “that 
economic growth has to some degree decoupled from territorial emissions, but not from 
consumption-based emissions” (Knight & Schor, 2014, p. 3729). As economies develop, 
they experience periods of both carbon intensification of GDP and carbon decoupling of 
GDP. Raupach et al. (2007), analyzing the Kaya model, find evidence of a sharp 
acceleration in emissions since the early 2000s and note that using the Kaya model 
breakdown, it appears that energy intensity of GDP and carbon intensity of energy have 
dramatically risen during that time. This paper’s empirical analysis will find supporting 
evidence of both these phenomena. First, there is global evidence of periods of both 
decoupling and intensification over time. Second, there is a sharp acceleration in the time 
series estimates, but the acceleration Raupach et al. (2007) find occurs after a rather sharp 
decline in the mid-1990s. The results from this paper are similar to those of Raupach et 




decoupling is a complicated process, one that is subject to the laws of capitalist 
accumulation, technical change, and profits, probably not following a stable EKC path. 
 
3.3. Data Sources and Description 
In addition to a focus on a time series analysis instead of a panel analysis, this 
paper utilizes a new CO2 emissions time series that incorporates some of the effects of 
the 2008 financial crisis. Global CO2 data come from Boden, Andres, and Marland 
(2013) and are an updated version of the CO2 data used in Steinberger and Roberts 
(2010). The CO2 time series Boden et al. estimate is global CO2 emissions from fossil 
fuel burning, cement manufacturing, and gas flaring: 1751-2010. Since 1751, 
approximately 365 billion metric tonnes of carbon have been released to the atmosphere 
from the consumption of fossil fuels and the production of cement. Half these fossil-fuel 
CO2 emissions have occurred since the mid-1980s. The 2010 global fossil fuel carbon 
emissions estimate, 9,167 million metric tons of carbon, represents an all-time high and a 
4.9% increase over the 2009 emissions. “The increase marks a quick recovery from the 
2008-2009 global financial crisis which had obvious economic and energy use 
consequences, particularly in North America and Europe” (Boden et al., 2013, website 
5/27/2015).  
Since 1950, CO2 estimates have come from the UN energy statistics, which is 
primarily composed of data from an annual questionnaire distributed by the UN. Boden et 
al. (2013) add gas flaring and cement manufacturing data from the U.S. Department of 




Burned fossil fuel more accurately captures the human element of CO2 emissions 
without the global fluctuations that occur from year to year with parts per million CO2 
(ppm). The Earth’s absorption and emission of CO2 can vary fairly drastically from year 
to year due to factors out of human control. The Boden et al. (2013) time series captures 
the anthropogenic contribution much better, even if it is an estimate and not a direct 
measure of ppm. ppm will have years of large accumulation and periods of relatively 
small rates of accumulation, which does not necessarily mean that humans are better in 
one year than in another, just that the Earth did a better job absorbing CO2 into the natural 
CO2 sinks.  In addition, seasonal elements need to be taken into consideration when using 
ppm as a dependent variable in a statistical model. Using ppm requires developing a more 
elaborate model that takes geological fluctuations into account.  
GWP data come from the United Nations main aggregates from unstats.un.org. 
The global aggregated expenditure decomposed GWP time series goes back only to 1970; 
thus this paper’s analysis begins there. All expenditure data are at constant 2005 prices in 
U.S. dollars, using purchasing power parity for other countries. For the purposes of this 





3.4. Methodology Description 
3.4.1. Bayesian Linear Regression 
 Bayesian linear regression is similar to a classical pooled data linear regression 
(Leamer, 1978). The Bayesian approach differs in that the regression “pools” information 
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from the data (X) and the information not in the data (the prior).  The classical pooled 
method pools information from two or more datasets (X) if they were collected in a 
frequentist manner. The inclusion of information not in the data is one of the dimensions 
where Bayesian and classical statistics differ. The inclusion of both sets of information 
(X and the prior) allows Bayesians to model full probability, in other words, estimating 
probability distributions as opposed to only point estimates. This approach is useful when 
interpreting results since all results from a Bayesian linear regression can be directly 
interpreted as a probability statement. These full models can also be directly compared to 
one another using Bayes factors. For instance, estimates from our analysis can be 
interpreted as the most likely value given the information, and the resulting quantiles are 
the corresponding values of the probability distribution. These estimates are not in 
relation to a null hypothesis unless such a hypothesis test is specifically set up. As a 
result, there will be no need to test for type I and type II errors
37
 (unless the analyst 
desires to test the hypothesis). 
As mentioned above, one of the ways Bayesian statistics is different from 
classical statistics is in its incorporation of information from the data as well as the 
information outside the data. Properly specifying the nondata information is the primary 
challenge to the Bayesian analyst. The nondata information needs to be stated completely 
in a statistical sense, with a full probability distribution. Summarizing nondata 
information into a probability distribution is difficult. The Bayesian literature has 
developed many methods for dealing with this inherently subjectively determined 
                                                 
37
 In a sense, the “hypothesis” test is internalized as the prior is “tested” by the data. The 
posterior probability distribution is tightened for an affirmation of the prior and loosened 




probability distribution (Gelman et al., 2014; Greenberg, 2008; Leamer, 1978; Marin & 
Robert, 2007). The analysis in this paper relies primarily on Bayesian updating and 
theoretical considerations to generate priors.  
 
3.4.2. Bayesian Updating 
The first manner in which time will be incorporated into this paper’s model is by 
using Bayesian updating. The Bayesian regression mimics the learning process, as most 
people know it. Typically, one does not explore a new concept, problem, or dataset in 
complete ignorance. Instead, individuals bring with them their past relevant experiences, 
theoretical considerations, and empirical results. Since economics and most social 
sciences deal almost exclusively in nonexperimental data, all social scientists bring   
nondata information to their statistical work (Leamer, 1978,  1983). For the Bayesian, 
this presents the problem of how to specify this external, nondata information in a 
probability distribution. For the classical statistician, this means engaging in specification 
searches, treating nonexperimental data as experimental data, ignoring standard error 
inflation, and modeling specification certainty.
38
  
Bayesian updating refers to the learning process described above. As new 
information becomes available, say in the form of a new dataset, individuals can update 
their beliefs by combining their data information (the data) with their nondata 
information (the prior). For the purposes of this paper, previous regression results will be 
weighted and combined with ‘new’ data. The information from previous regressions will 
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 Leamer (1978), Leamer (1983), and Kass and Raftery (1995) discuss model and 
specification uncertainty as well as allude to the problems of frequentist violation of 
BLUE assumptions. Marin and Roberts (2007), Greenberg (2008), and Gelman et al. 




be represented with a probability distribution (the prior) and combined with a ‘new’ 
dataset to generate a new posterior distribution (a fully expressed conditional probability 
statement for all the parameters of the model). This new posterior probability distribution 
is the probabilistic representation of the analyst’s current state of knowledge about the 
parameters in this paper’s models. When we want to explore a new data series, we will 
use this posterior probability distribution generated in the past to represent the ‘new’ 
nondata information (prior) and combine it with the ‘newer’ data to generate a ‘newer’ 
posterior distribution. This updating is at the core of Bayesian theory and statistical 
inference and requires no ad hoc assumptions or procedures. In this sense, Bayesian 
statistics is inherently time-series oriented.  
 
3.5. Empirical Model 
3.5.1. Model Design and Reasoning 
The model estimated for three priors assumptions is: 
 
lnBFFCO2 ~ lnFCE + lnFKF + lnEX + e. (3.1) 
 
All parameters in these models are log-linearized and represent aggregated global 
expenditure values. The models regressed logged final consumption expenditure 
(lnFCE), logged fixed capital formation (lnFKF), and logged total export expenditures 





lnFCE includes both global government and global household consumption 
expenditures. Originally, we attempted to estimate the model with both government and 
household consumption subsets, but due to limitations in the data (collinearity), we chose 
the aggregated lnFCE over the subsets. lnFKF represents global investment. To capture 
on some level the effects of trade on emission, lnEX represents total global expenditures 
on exports. Imports were left out for obvious collinearity reasons. These models provide 
a rather poor exploration of the business cycle’s impact on emissions due to the use of a 
10-year rolling window, which will most likely smooth out smaller economic 
fluctuations.  
One of the very significant limitations of these data is how collinear expenditure 
data in general are (Figure 3.1). One would expect that global periods that are “good” for 
consumption would occur at times when it is also “good” to invest. Expenditures are 
clearly procyclical with respect to one another, as the income of a business is also the 
consumer’s effective demand. When the economy is in a period of strong effective 
demand, firms, households, and governments are all free to consume more.  
This collinearity provides a challenge for analysts interested in seeing the 
underlying relationships between types of GDP and emissions. The level of correlation 
between the explanatory variables renders individual parameter estimates more or less 
meaningless, which produces perplexing individual parameter estimates such as long-
running negative estimated values. If an analyst were to take such estimated values 
seriously, a negative value would mean that global expenditure was driving down 
emissions! Long-run negative estimated values are clearly a sign of multicollinearity 




completely sink their emissions. It is still, however, beneficial to the models to estimate 
the individual expenditures since this approach allows for a more refined prior 
specification. As will be discussed later, prior specification will be subjectively adjusted 
to deal with some of the issues caused by collinear independent variables.  
 
3.5.2. Collinearity Restrictions 
We employ two approaches to address the collinearity of the data. The first is 
aggregation of variables. Household and government consumption are aggregated to 
create final consumption expenditure. Aggregation is a method for both classical and 
Bayesian approaches (Theil, 1971). 
The second approach to handling the problems of collinearity of the data is to not 
accept prior information that is clearly a result of collinearity-induced estimate confusion. 
As will be discussed in the next section, one variant of the model uses previous 
regression estimates as prior information in subsequent regressions. For this model 
variant, prior information about parameters is not accepted if it is negative. Instead, it is 
replaced by a neutral value (0.5). This value was selected because it is equally far away 
from absolute decoupling (negative values) and absolute intensification (values greater 
than one). Parameters with negative estimated values also have the lowest weighting 
placed on them as well. The weighting of prior information is discussed below. 
 
3.5.3. The Rolling Regression Model 
This paper does not use a “formal” time series model; these models are not 




regression. A 10-year sliding window traverses the data year by year, officially beginning 
with the 1970 to 1979 window and continuing until the final 10-year window, 2001 to 
2010. This method is synergistic with a straightforward Bayesian interpretation of the 
results. The results provide a clear picture of the parameter estimates through time in a 
manner that accounts for some delay (10 years) in expenditure to emissions. The results 
also provide a clear picture of model and parameter uncertainty through time, as a full 
posterior probability distribution is estimated for all 32 periods.  
The 10-year window limits the effects of a 1-year deviation in economic or 
emission activity and allows for a reasonable delay between time of expenditure and 
emissions. Long-term investments that may have a profound effect on emission may not 
be fully captured within this time frame, but it seems likely that the emission signatures 
of most expenditure are at least sufficiently captured. 
  
3.5.4. Defining Priors and Weighting in the Rolling Regression 
In this section, the prior and their associated weights are considered. The weights 
refer to the shape of the prior probability distribution. The smaller the value of the 
weight, the “flatter” the prior probability, meaning that the actual maximum of that 
probability distribution (the point given for the prior) is weighted less.  
 
3.5.4.1. Noninformative Prior Nonweighted Model (reg) 
The first model is used to demonstrate a noninformative prior with a nonadjusting 
weight, which simulates a non-Bayesian updating rolling regression. No information 




prior of 0.5 was selected because it is equal distance away from absolute decoupling 
(values <0) and absolute intensification (values >1). The value of 0.5 was selected for 
each iteration of the regression for the whole time series. Because the prior value is set 
for each iteration of the rolling regression, this model does not have fluctuating weighting 
functions. The weighting value for the prior is set to 0.001; this is a flat prior, meaning 
not much emphasis is placed on the prior of 0.5 in relation to the data maximum 
likelihood estimator.  
The regression estimated, however, is still considered “Bayesian” since it 
produces a fully defined probability model. There is no external information incorporated 
in the prior and a rigid treatment of the 0.5 priors. This model should still outperform an 
OLS estimate since it does contain more information, but the model can be considered to 
be a proxy for such frequentist methods.  
 
3.5.4.2. Decoupling Model Prior (regdc) 
The second model considered in this paper’s analysis uses its prior to simulate 
steady decoupling. For this model, initially, a prior of .75 is selected. The value of .75 
represents a “good” guess based on the summed model value for the 1970-1978-
regression window,
39
 which also agrees with the nonmodel intuition: increasing 
expenditure will increase pollution but probably not in a one-to-one manner. For each 
iteration of the rolling regression, this model’s prior decreases by 0.01, reflecting 
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 The model was ‘calibrated’ by progressively building up the rolling 10-year window 
starting from the 1970-1974 data window. An additional year was added to the window, 
expanding the regressions data frame to 1970-1975 and so on until the window 1970-
1979 was reached. During the ‘calibration’ phase, weights were not adjusted, but 




technological change and steady decoupling. The rate of decrease represents not more 
than a guess and is not based on estimation or firmly held prior beliefs. The prior 
decreases from .75 to .44 through the course of the time series.  
This model receives a weighting treatment different from that for the 
noninformative, nonweighted prior model previously discussed. This model is not trying 
to be a proxy for a frequentist method but rather in a Bayesian manner test the hypothesis 
of consistent decoupling. Thus, the weighting function adjusts according to how well the 
prior did for each parameter being estimated. If a parameter value, lnFCE for instance, 
were estimated to be negative, the weight on the subsequent iterations prior for lnFCE 
would be ‘flat’ or weighted at 0.001. Using the posterior probability distribution, the 
weighting function assesses whether the probability distribution shows sign agreement 
for the parameter estimates at two separate levels (2.5-97.5% and 25-75%). If a given 
parameter posterior probability distribution has sign agreement at the 25 to 75% 
probability levels, then the subsequent prior will have increased weight placed on it going 
from 0.001 to 0.01. If the same parameter posterior probability distribution has sign 
agreement at the 2.5-97.5% probability levels of the posterior, then the prior weight on 
the subsequent iteration will be raised further from 0.01 to 0.1. A robust parameter 
estimate is demonstrated by sign agreement at the 2.5-97.5% probability levels. However, 
due to the limitation of the data (collinearity), these adjustment weights and ‘robust’ 
parameter estimates are used only for weighting and later on in updating and are not 






3.5.4.3. Bayesian Updating Prior Model (regrw) 
For the last model, the analysis fully implements a Bayesian updating framework 
with adjusting weights. As discussed earlier (Section 3.4.2), Bayesian updating within 
this rolling regression model uses the previous iteration posterior probability for each 
estimated parameter as the priors for the next iteration’s regression. This approach leads 
to information from previous periods, say data from the 1970s, being incorporated into 
the regression for the 2000s. For each parameter within these models (the intercept, 
lnFCE, lnFKF, and lnEX),
40
 the previous period’s posterior becomes the next period’s 
prior except in the case when a negative value is estimated in the previous period. If, for 
instance, lnEX had been estimated with a negative value, the prior would not take the 
clearly incorrect negative value but instead assign lnEX in the next period a prior value of 
0.5 with a weight of 0.001.
41
 Negative values on the posterior parameter ranges of 2.5-
97.5% and 25-75% are handled in the same manner as the regression model that was 
emulating steady decoupling (regdc) for prior weighting purposes. This approach 
incorporates information from previous regressions in the most explicit manner, allowing 
for longer run trends (beyond the 10-year window) to be accounted for on some level.  
 
3.5.5. Bayes Factors 
The Bayes factor is a Bayesian tool that “corresponds to the classical odds or 
likelihood ratio the difference being that the parameters are integrated rather than 
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 The intercept value does not have any weighting or adjustment. It is included only to 
generate a proper prior distribution.  
41
 Since it is extremely unlikely that any aggregated expenditure category has 
experienced absolute decoupling, negative values are thrown out in the updating process 




maximized under each model” (Marin & Robert, 2007, p. 29).42 The Bayes factor allows 
for hypothesis testing in a fully Bayesian manner where an analyst can directly compare 
model posterior probabilities to one another and get a relative sense of which model the 
data ‘prefer’. For the purpose of this paper’s analysis, Bayes factors are employed to 
determine what prior the data prefer and if there is positive support in favor of one model 
specification over another. 
The results of the Bayes factors presented in this paper are the logged likelihood 
ratios of one model over another. According to Kass and Raftery, values between 0-2 
demonstrate evidence “Not worth more than a bare mention supporting one model to 
another model” (1995, p. 777). Values 2-6 represent “positive” evidence supporting one 
model over another, 6-10 represent “strong” support, and values greater than 10 represent 
“very strong” support.  
Both the regrw and regdc outperform the reg model. Figure 3.2 presents the 
results for both regdc and regrw in relation to the reg model. There are only 3 years 
where the reg model performs as well as regdc (2006, 2007, and 2008) and 4 years where 
reg performs as well as regrw (2005, 2006, 2007, and 2008). Figure 3.2 suggests a 
dynamic prior for the most part outperforms a noninformative prior; Bayesian updating 
produces a better model.  
For regrw and regdc, both models seem to have similar posterior marginal 
likelihoods (results shown in Figure 3.3). regrw outperforms regdc enough to mention for 
3 years (1999, 2000, and 2001) whereas regdc outperforms regrw  for 3 years (1979, 
1985, and 2005). These two models are nearly identical with the exception of a few years 
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while one model adapts to a new time series relationship. With the exception of 1979, all 
differences between these two models are associated with large movements in the data 
that will be validated by all three models. In the next section, it will be shown that 
although there are differences in the posterior marginal likelihood of these three models, 
all three find the same relationship within the data.  
 
3.6. Model Results 
Figure 3.4 presents the results for the three models. The models reg and regdc 
produce almost identical results. The reason regdc has a higher posterior marginal 
likelihood, and thus a higher Bayes factor, is because of small differences in the 
variances, posterior distribution, and low weighting values of the prior for regdc for most 
of the time series.
43
 The most obvious result from these three models is the sharp decline 
in the estimated carbon intensity of GWP in the 1990s. Throughout the 1980s, emission 
intensity appears to fluctuate between 0.6 and 0.8, meaning for every 1% increase in 
GWP there is a 0.6-0.8% increase in CO2 emissions. After 1992, there is a significant and 
profound decline in CO2 intensity of GWP, bottoming out in 2000 (reflecting the whole 
decade of the 90s). The data are not rich enough to test or discern why all three models 
estimate a rather significant decoupling during the 1990s. However, one could reasonably 
expect two potential explanations for this decoupling: The collapse of the Soviet Union’s 
notoriously carbon-intensive economic system and the strong growth in GWP in the mid-
1990s. As the global production became cleaner with the fall of the Soviet economies, the 
CO2 time series flattened out while the GWP surged, which either produced a couple of 
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 By not achieving high prior weights, the regdc model ends up differing from the data 




years of serious decoupling or at least the appearance of serious decoupling before the 
growth in GWP, and later China again strongly pulled CO2 intensity up.  
Following this dramatic decline is a corresponding intensification that leaves the 
carbon intensity of GWP roughly at its pre-decline levels (>1992 levels). This 
intensification in the early 2000s was also captured in the Kaya model discussed earlier 
(Raupach et al., 2007).  
The three models clearly show supporting evidence of Jorgensen and Clark’s 
dynamic decoupling behavior of ‘mini-cycles’ but on a global scale (also seen in Knight 
& Schor, 2014). Even prior to the sharp cycle in the 1990s, which is most likely 
historically specific, the 1980s presented fluctuation and a ‘stable’ but ‘unclear’ behavior.  
There is clearly a need for additional work, especially for more time series work 
that can control for dramatic changes in global production, such as the collapse of the 
Soviet Bloc in the early 1990s, as some panel studies do. It is reasonable to speculate that 
changing global production as a result of the decline of the Soviet Union and the rise of 
information technology resulted in a temporary decoupling of global production from 
emissions. It is also reasonable to speculate as Raupach et al. (2007) do that the rise of 
China and India has driven the troubling intensification through the 2000s.  
For regrw, we see regrw estimates a lower value or more decoupling in the late 
1990s and early 2000s. For the three regressions that the regrw model clearly 
outperformed both reg and regdc models (1999, 2000, and 2001), regrw is estimating 
absolute decoupling. However, the return to ‘normal’ values in the 2000s was also a 
sharp recovery. The regrw prior would have more easily incorporated the structural break 




the 1990s. The regdc model, as its prior values were predetermined to follow a steady 
decline, would have resisted the model being pulled down as far as regrw. 
Correspondingly, in the years of intensification, regrw would have still been using priors 
formed during the decoupling period and thus would have had to adjust to the 
intensification over several iterations of the model. regdc would have had a higher prior 
for the period of recovery and would not have been incorporating the past information 
into its estimations. This inertia might explain some of the differences between the 
models following the 90s. 
The most interesting result from these three models is the similarity of the 
estimates, which show that the data very strongly exhibit the characteristics displayed in 
Figure 3.4.  The decoupling and intensification that was estimated in the time series for 
these three models is not the result of biased priors or an extensive specification search; 
rather it appears to be an inherent characteristic of these data. There appears to be 
decoupling/intensification mini-cycles on an aggregated and global scale, not just for 
individual countries. All three specifications point to global mini-cycles, a 1990s 
decoupling and an intensification in the 2000s as well as fluctuation in the 1980s. 
The posterior probability distribution for all three models shows a similar result. 
Figure 3.5 displays the points at the 25, 50, and 75% marks for all three models. Again, 
reg and regdc end up with nearly identical estimations as the evidence drowns their priors 
out while regrw mirrors very closely the results of the other two models. One clear result 
from Figure 3.5 is an asymmetry in model certainty with regard to the decoupling in the 
1990s and the intensification in the 2000s.  The models appear to be more certain about 




change that much. In contrast, the 2000s intensification leads to greater model uncertainty 
among all the models as the 25-75% estimates grow further apart, suggesting a flattening 
posterior probability distribution. Figure 3.5 also demonstrates the level of uncertainty 
that exists within this dataset and decoupling studies in general. For instance, in the early 
2000s, the models are equally sure that the true model estimate is nearly -1.5 or 3! 
Although this is the most uncertain the models were throughout the time series, it speaks 
to the fact that all decoupling studies should be taken with a grain of salt, as there exist 
many potential model specifications that could generate ‘significance’. This paper’s 
analysis attempts to deal with some of the specification uncertainty by estimating three 
models that utilize different prior information. Surprisingly, the data seem to indicate that 
there is an underlying trend throughout this time series even if the trend is fuzzy.  
 
3.7. Conclusion and Continuations 
This paper’s analysis has lent supporting evidence to other empirical works that 
show a dynamic relationship between GWP and CO2 emissions (Jorgenson & Clark, 
2012; Knight & Schor, 2014; Raupach et al., 2007). All three models show evidence of 
mini-cycles and large movements within the decoupling relationship. These dynamics are 
critical for understanding how much ‘greening’ of growth should be accounted for in 
economy models and other forecasts. 
One of the areas this study highlights for future research is the level of model 
uncertainty involved with linear regressions of these data. Many different models that 




years where significant statistics could be found, but an analysis of the entire time series 
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